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THE NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE AFTER BRANZBURG V. HAYES: WHITHER NOW?
Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers with-
out a government, I should not hesitate for a moment to prefer the latter.
THOMAS JIPERsON
In the 1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes,' the
Supreme Court ruled that requiring newsmen to
appear and testify before state or federal grand
juries does not abridge the freedoms of speech and
press guaranteed by the first amendment. The
national press responded to this ruling in an "orgy
of self pity," 2 the many apocalyptic accounts of
the decision suggesting an early arrival of 1984.3
It is both predictable and fortunate that the
Branzburg holding is less destructive of first amend-
ment freedoms than these accounts suggest.4 The
precise implications of the case, however, is a
question that lawyers and law professors will
debate for years. 5 It is the purpose of this comment
to make an early contribution to that debate.
Section one will outline the decision in Branzburg
v. Hayes, isolating the arguments addressed by the
Court and delineating the limits of the holding.
Section two will put the question of a newsman's
privilege in historical perspective, suggesting that
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Branzburg is in
accord with that history. Section three will present
1408 U.S. 665 (1972).
2Blasi, The Justice and the Journalist, 215 NATION
198 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Blasi, NATION].
3 See, e.g., Anderson, High Court Attacks Freedom of
Press, Chicago Daily News, Dec. 1, 1972, at 15, col. 1
(judge is "upholding the power of the government,
Kremlin-like, to control the flow of information to the
people"); Breslin, A Silent Assault on the First Amend-
ient?, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 11, 1972, at 26, col. 1
("a persistent, silent, evil, vicious assault on the rights
of the people"); Oliphant, The First Amendment
(amended), Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 24, 1972, at 38,
col. 3 (political cartoon); N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1972,
at 46, col. 1 (constitutional protections for freedom of
the press are being "hacked away"); cf. Seattle Post-
Intligencer, June 17, 1966, at -, col. -, quoted in
Beaver, The Newsman's Code, the Claim of Privilege and
Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 ORE. L. Rxv. 243,
249 n.32 (1968). But see Kilpatrick, Press Has Come a
Long Way in Freedom Quest, Chicago Daily News,
Dec. 2-3, 1972, at 12, col. 6.
4 Blasi, NATION.
5 Id.
an argument in favor of a limited newsman's
privilege which differs in crucial respects from the
arguments heretofore presented to the courts,
which is consistent with the historical considera-
tions that properly proved persuasive to the
majority in Branzburg, and which, accordingly, is
likely to garner judicial acceptance.
I. TnE HOLDING IN Branzburg v. Hayes
In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court
reviews four cases which raise in varied contexts
the single issue of whether the Constitution guar-
antees to newsmen6 a qualified privilege to with-
hold grand jury testimony. The writ of certiorari
in No. 70-857 brought before the Court two judg-
ments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, both
involving Paul Branzburg, a staff reporter for the
Courier-Journal of Louisville, Kentucky. The first
judgment denied a petition for prohibition and
mandamus against a trial court order that Branz-
burg appear before a Jefferson County grand jury
and identify certain individuals he had seen
possessing marijuana and making hashish. The
second judgment 9 rejected Branzburg's petition
to quash a summons directing his appearance
before a Franklin County grand jury investigating
narcotics violations. The writ of certiorari in No.
70-9410 initiated High Court review of In re
Pappas," wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts upheld the denial of a newsman's
motion to quash a summons requiring his presence
6 It is exceedingly difficult to define the term "news-
man." See text accompanying note 255 infra.
7402 U.S. 942 (1971).
8 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App.
1970), modified on denial of rehearing, 461 S.W.2d 345
(1971).
9Apparently, the second judgment against Paul
Branzburg was not reported at the lower level. See
408 U.S. at 671 & n.6.
10 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
I Mass. __, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
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before a grand jury which was apparently investi-
gating Black Panther involvement in a prior civil
disturbance. The writ of certiorari in No. 70-5712
involved Caldwell v. United States,18 a decision of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had
inspired much hope among proponents of a news-
man's privilege' 4 by reversing the contempt cita-
tion of a reporter who refused to appear before a
federal grand jury despite the existence of a protec-
tive order limiting the permissible range of ques-
tioning.1
Petitioners Branzburg and Pappas and respond-
ent Caldwell asserted that confidential news
sources are measurably deterred when newsmen
are required to appear and testify before a grand
jury. They further maintained that the resultant
detrimental impact on the free flow of information
to the public is inconsistent with first amendment
guarantees. Concluding that the alleged infringe-
ment of Constitutional freedoms could not be
justified unless necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest, the reporters urged that
they should not be forced to appear or testify
before a grand jury until it is established that: (1)
there are sufficient grounds for believing that the
reporter possesses information relevant to the
grand jury investigation; (2) such information is
unavailable from other sources; and (3) the need
for such information is "sufficiently compelling to
override the claimed invasion of First Amendment
- 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
13434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
14 See, e.g., Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources:
Emerging Constitutional Protection, 60 GEo. L.J. 867,
1082 (1972); Comment, The Newsman's Qualified Privi-
lege Under the First Amendment, 16 S. DAm. L. REv.
328, 346 (1971).
15 The protective order was granted by the court in
In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
The order specifically provided:
(2) That... Mr. Caldwell shall not be required to
answer questions concerning statements made to
him or information given to him by members of
the Black Panther Party unless such statements
or information were given to him for publication
or public disclosure; (3) That ... Mr. Caldwell
shall be permitted to consult with his counsel at
any time he wishes during the course of his ap-
pearance before the grand jury... (5) That the
Court will entertain a motion for modification of
this order at any time upon a showing by the gov-
ernment of a compelling and overriding national
interest in requiring Mr. Caldwell's testimony
which cannot be served by any alternative means.
Id. at 362. The Government did not appeal this pro-
tective order. Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources,
supra note 14, at 1083 n.1243.
interests." 16 The Supreme Court refused to impose
this tripartite burden upon the government and
ruled that newsmen are not constitutionally im-
mune from grand jury subpoenas. Consistent with
this ruling, the Court affirmed in Nos. 70-85 and
70-94, and reversed in No. 70-57.
Certain ambiguities complicate any effort to
outline the limitations of the holding in Branzburg
v. Hayes. These ambiguities inhere in the struc-
turing of the majority opinion, the peculiar status
of Mr, Justice Powell's concurring opinion, and
the uncertain light cast by the two dissenting
opinions.
Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, dis-
cusses numerous arguments, but no single argu-
ment or group of arguments is isolated as being
determinative of the ultimate issue. The disposition
of the four cases being reviewed is summary in
form and is prefaced with the remark that the
results follow from what has been said.17 Since the
implications vary according to the weight attached
to each of the various arguments posited, the White
opinion invites conflicting interpretations.1 '
This ambiguity is compounded by the peculiar
status of a separate opinion by Mr. Justice Powell.
Justice Powell formally joined the majority
opinion, and his concurring opinion is written for
the stated purpose of emphasizing "the limited
nature of the Court's holding." 19 Although the
Powell opinion is characterized as "enigmatic" by
Mr. Justice Stewart, 20 it seems to adumbrate a
constitutional standard substantially more protec-
tive of the newsman than that envisioned by Mr.
Justice White. Moreover, since Powell's vote was
pivotal, his understanding of the majority view
may prove controlling in future adjudication.2
The two dissenting opinions are of scant assist-
ance in ascertaining the subtle nuances of the
majority opinion which will guide the course of
subsequent litigation. In his dissenting opinion,
Mr. Justice Douglas posits the thesis that the
10408 U.S. at 680; cf. People v. Dohm, Crim. No.
69-3808 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., 11. May 20, 1970); Com-
ment, Confidentiality of News Sources, supra note 14, at
1093 n.1301; Note, The Journalist and His Confidential
Source: Should a Testimonial Privilege Be Allowed, 35
NEB. L. RFv. 562, 580 (1956); Note, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rxv.
617, 631 (1971).
17 408 U.S. at 708.
Is Blasi, NATION.
29 408 U.S. at 709 (Powel, J., concurring).
20 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
21 Blasi, NATION; cf. A Nixon Court Scorecard, HAR-
Pxn's, Dec. 1972, at 30: "Powell has not yet disagreed
with his Nixon colleagues where his vote would have
changed the result of any case."
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first and fifth amendments, considered in con-
junction, guarantee to the newsman an absolute
testimonial privilege.2 2 Since he claims that this
privilege cannot be constitutionally denied under
any circumstance, Douglas does not consider the
possible contours of a limited privilege.
Somewhat more helpful in this respect is the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall. The Stewart
dissent accords with the majority view in rejecting
an absolute newsman's privilege, 7 but differs as
to the circumstances which justify compulsory
testimony.24 Although Justice Stewart summarizes
his understanding of the protections afforded by
the White opinion,25 he casts little light on the
holding. Stewart suggests that the majority has
rejected any newsman's privilege 6 and thus would
permit governmental fishing expeditions at the
expense of the press; 7 these conclusions, however,
are contrary to explicit disclaimers in the White
and Powell29 opinions.
Notwithstanding these ambiguities, it is clear
that Branzburg v. Hayes does not preclude a
testimonial privilege for newsmen under any and
all circumstances. Certain limitations on the hold-
2 408 U.S. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23 408 U.S. at 744 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
24 IW]hen a reporter is asked to appear before a
grand jury and reveal confidences, I would hold
that the government must (1) show that there is
probable cause to believe that the newsman has
information that is clearly relevant to a specific
probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that
the information sought cannot be obtained by
alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a com-
pelling and overriding interest in the informa-
tion.
408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted). Cf. D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe:
Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6
HARv. J. LEGis. 307, 339 (1969); cases and materials
cited note 16 supra.
26 The crux of the Court's rejection of any news-
man's privilege is its observation that only
"where news sources themselves are implicated
in crime or possess information relevant to the
grand jury's task need they or the reporter be
concerned about grand jury subpoenas."
408 U.S. at 744 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).26 Id.
27 [The majority invites the government] to try to
annex the press as an investigative arm, since any
time government wants to probe the relation-
ships between the newsman and his source, it
can, on virtually any pretext, convene a grand
jury and compel the journalist to testify.
408 U.S. at 744 n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28408 U.S. at 707.
29 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
ing are explicitly articulated by the Court,30 and
others are implicit in the factual situations pre-
sented for adjudication.
The primary protection for the reporter expressly
recognized in the White opinion is that grand jury
investigations must be made in "good faith." 31
One commentator has minimized the significance
of this requirement by noting that the good faith
standard "is a safeguard that all witnesses already
enjoy, quite apart from the first amendment." 3
Notwithstanding this criticism, the requirement is
of critical importance since it guards against the
use of the grand jury subpoena power as a tool for
harassing and punishing the press. Theoretically
such abuse is improbable since the grand jury is an
adjunct of the judiciary and not the executive.33
In practical terms, however, there is a growing
fear that the grand jury has become a rubber stamp
of the executive, all but automatically following
the direction of the prosecuting attorney.u Thus,
one proponent of a federal statutory newsman's
privilege insists that so long as "the Government
possesses the right to subpoena reporters to compel
disclosure of confidential information, it possesses
the power to harass and intimidate the press." 35
Although direct evidence that this power is cur-
rently being abused is somewhat meager,36 indirect
evidence justifies concern: Law enforcement
30 Since the majority ruled against the newsman in
each of the four cases presented for review, the limita-
tions articulated by the Court are, of course, obiter
diclum.
3' [N]ews gathering is not without its First Amend-
ment protections, and grand jury investigations
if instituted or conducted other than in good
faith, would pose wholly different issue for reso-
lution under the First Amendment. Official
harassment of the press undertaken not for pur-
poses of law enforcement but to disrupt a re-
porter's relationship with his news sources would
have no justification.
408 U.S. at 707-08.
1
2 Blasi, NATION.
1 See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 708 (grand juries are subject
to judicial control); Siklek v. Commonwealth, 133 Va.
789, 112 S.E. 605 (1922) (grand jury an adjunct of
the court).
'4 Donner & Cerruti, The Grand Jury Network: How
the Nixon Administration Has Secretly Perverted a Tra-
ditional Safeguard of Individual Rights, 214 NATION 5
(1972).
35 Newsmen's Privilege Legislation Called "Essential"
to Preserve Free Press, 12 BNA Carm. L. REP. 2101,
2103 (Nov. 1, 1972); ef. Desmond, The Newsmen's
Privilege Bill, 13 ALBANY L. Rnv. 1, 8-9 (1949).
3 As was stated by Rep. Robert Drinan (D- Mass)
during recent congressional debates on a federal news-
man's privilege, "If the Branzburg decision represented
a day of infamy, we'd like to see some of the blood to
justify this legislation." House Subcommittee Condldes
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officials often have a vested interest in curtailing
press activities;7 in recent years there has been a
vast increase in the number of subpoenas served
upon the press;" and the secrecy of the grand jury
can effectively cloak abuses by prosecuting at-
torneys.P9 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas
fears that the good faith standard will prove to be
a hollow protection unless the Supreme Court is
willing to penetrate the realities behind the govern-
ment's exculpatory rationale.45 If vigorously
enforced, however, the good faith limitation can
retard abuse of grand jury subpoena power and
prevent harassment of the press."
A second limitation enunciated in the White
opinion is that grand jury questioning of news
reporters must be relevant to the immediate in-
vestigation." Unless adequately restrained, the
grand jury has the power to "wildly spray members
of an entire group with subpoenas," and to inquire
Initial Hearings on Newsmen's Privilege Bill, 12 BNA
C~mI. L. REP. 2081, 2083 (Oct. 25, 1972).
37408 U.S. at 724 & n.12 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). Usually, the
newspaper story giving rise to a press subpoena con-
troversy is one charging some kind of public corruption,
especially a failure to enforce the laws. See, e.g., People
ex rd. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415
(1936); Charles L. Leonard & Douglas Clark (unre-
ported) Ei)rroR & PuBmSHn , Mar. 6, 1948, at 7;
E. B. Chapman (unreported) N.Y. Times, Apr. 20,
1940, at 8, col 4; Sherman Stambaugh (unreported)
N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1939, at 19, col. 4; Desmond,
supra note 35; Harvey, Protection of News Sources in
Pennsylvania, 35 PENN. BAR AssN. Q. 197, 203 (1964);
Note, The Journalist and His Confidential Source, supra
note 16, at 569 n.22; Comment, Compulsory Disclosure
of a Newsman's Source: A Compromise Proposal, 54
Nw. U.L. REv, 243, n.4 (1959); Note, The Right of a
Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of His
Information, 36 VA. L. REv. 61, 70 n.59 (1950).
"See Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources,
supra note 14, at 1081; Comment, The Newsman's
Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecu-
tlions and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1198
(1970); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Con-
stitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YaE
L.J. 317, n.1 (1970).
39 Donner & Cerruti, supra note 34.
40 Id. at 20. Insofar as Justice Douglas' warning is
premised upon an evaluation of the political predilec-
tions of the Nixon Court, the question presented is
beyond the scope of this comment For an excellent
discussion of the Nixon Court, see Bender, The Tech-
niques of Subtle Erosion, HARPER's, Dec. 1972, at 18,
26; Goldberg, The Berger Court 1971 Term: One Step
Forward, Two Steps Backwardl, 63 3. Canr. L. & C.
43 (1972).
" See, e.g., Chicago Daily News, Feb. 17-18, 1973,
at 8, col. 1 (editorial charges that FBI was under White
House orders to "nail" reporter Les Whitten for his
repeated disclosures of information embarassing to the
administration; grand jury refused to comply). But see
Punishment by Harassment, 215 NATION 196 (1972).
2See note 25 supra.
into matters wholly removed from its basic con-
cerns." Two dangers inhere in grand jury fishing
expeditions. First, if the rules are "twisted into
instruments for coercing the press into the role of
government agents," ' A public trust in the news
media will be materially undermined. 45 Second,
if the government is allowed to annex the news
media as an investigative arm, the independence
of the press will be seriously jeopardized.l
The relevancy standard is designed to insure
that this legitimate concern does not become a
disastrous reality. Justice Stewart contends that
the standard is inadequate to the task, and that the
Court erred in refusing to apply a meaningful
"probable cause" requirement.0 There is sub-
stantial support for the Stewart contention. First,
as the majority admits, a grand jury investigation
"may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence
proferred by the prosecution, or the personal
knowledge of the grand jurors." 4 Second, the
subject matter under investigation is often ex-
tremely broad and ill-defined, and the information
sought from the reporter may be correspondingly
unlimited. 9 Finally, there are significant legal
barriers to asserting the irrelevancy of a grand
jury question.50
The adequacy of the relevancy standard is
ultimately dependent on judicial sensitivity to the
needs of the press. On the one hand, where the
grand jury is immune from judicial supervision, no
standard, however strictly formulated, can prevent
wholesale prosecutorial invasion of a newsman's
files. The "reasonable likelihood test"51 promul-
4Donner & Cerruti, supra note 34, at 6.
"Imprisoned Press, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1972, at
46, col. 1; Caldwell, Ask Me. I Know. I Was the Test
Case., SAT. REv., Aug. 5, 1972, at 4, 5:
The FBI wanted to pick my brain. They wanted
me to slip behind my news sources, to act like the
double agents I saw on TV.
45 Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources, supra
note 14, at 1081 n.1234.4 8 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d at 1086; Com-
ment, Confidentiality of News Sources, supra note 14,
at 1086 n.1261; Comment, Government Investigations,
supra note 38, at 1199.
47 408 U.S. at 744 n.34.
48 408 U.S. at 701.
49 Comment, Government Investigations, supra note
38, at 1199.
10 See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282
(1919), where the Court stated that a witness "is not
entitled to urge objections of incompetence or irrele-
vancy, such as a party might raise, for this is no con-
cem of his." See generally Comment, The Rights of a
Witness Before A Grand Jury, 1967 DuxE L.J. 97,
111-12 (1967).
61 Disclosure of a newsman's information and sources
is constitutional when there is a "reasonable likelihood"
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gated by the Hawaii Supreme Court in It re Good-
fader's Appeal'2 did not halt a purported fishing
expedition by the plaintiffY.5 The more stringent
"heart of the inquiry test" utilized by the Second
Circuit in Garland v. Torre5 allowed the affirma-
tion of an order which compelled disclosure of a
news source of doubtful relevance to the pro-
ceedings." Even the "compelling interest test ''
outlined by the Ninth circuit in Caldwell v.
United States-" has proved a dubious protection:
In State v. Knwps59 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held a reporter in contempt even though the in-
formation sought concerning a campus bombing
had already been attained by alterative means. 60
On the other hand, the relevancy standard was
recognized at common law and sufficed to protect
a number of recalcitrant newsmen from contempt
citations for failure to testify." Properly applied,
the standard can continue to shield the reporter
from prosecutorial abuse." As one commentator
has noted, lower court judges "who appreciate
the need for a newsman's privilege should feel
little constrained by Branzburg v. Hayes."6"
A third limitation is expressly noted in the White
opinion: The holding of the Court is subject to
statutory modification. At the federal level, Con-
gress has the power to fashion a statutory news-
man's privilege "with standards and rules as
narrow or broad as deemed necessary."" Simi-
larly, state courts are free to "recognize a news-
man's privilege, either qualified or absolute." 5 As
one commentator has observed, Justice White not
only leaves the door open for a statutory privi-
lege, but at times seems to go so far as to recom-
mend such legislation.66 The judicial doctrine that
that the desired information will be relevant to the
judicial subject of inquiry. For a discussion of the vari-
ous tests utilized by the courts in weighing the compet-
ing interests in newsman's privilege cases, see Comment,
The Newsman's Privilege and the Constitution, 23 SomrH
CAR. L. REv. 436 (1971); Note, Reporters and Their
Sources, supra note 38, at 322-25.
52 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
W Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for
Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv.
18, 23 (1969); Comment, Constitutional Law: Privilege
of Newsmen to Conceal Source of Information, 15 OxLA.
L. REv. 453, 455 (1962).
'The question asked of the newsman must go to
the heart of the inquiry.
55 259 F.2d 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958).
fi See, e.g., Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D.
439, 441 (S.D. Tex. 1969), where the court quoted
extensively from the Garland opinion in denying the
requested privilege on the ground that taking a deposi-
tion was a necessary step in the preparation of a trial;
Comment, The Newsman's Qualified Privilege, supra
note 14, at 336.
testimonial privileges must be created by legislative
action is a plausible justification for this recom-
mendation.Y
The language utilized by the majority in
Branzburg is difficult to reconcile, however, with
the sixth amendment guarantee that a defendant
in a criminal action has the power to compel the
compulsory testimony of witnesses.Y It has been
argued that the newsman's privilege is almost cer-
tainly limited by the defendant's right to com-
pulsory testimony in a criminal trial.69 Accord-
ingly, some commentators have questioned the
The newsman cannot be forced to testify in the
absence of a compelling governmental interest.
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1790).
69 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
60 Note, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 184, 188 (1972); Note,
Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 38, at 326 n.40:
"This interpretation of the compelling need tests sug-
gests that disclosure could always be compelled during
an investigation into possible criminal conduct." Cf.
Comment, ConfUentiality of News Sources, supra note
14, at 1087 n.1262: "What in an individual case will
satisfy the 'compelling and overriding interest test' is
not easily determined."61 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Carroll in re Lyons, 99 F.
Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (since Lyon's statement
was merely a paraphrase of known information, his
source was irrelevant to the proceedings); William G.
Cayce (unreported) EDrOR & PUBIkisizx, Aug. 19,
1933, at 20 (held that since the grand jury had already
found an indictment in the murder case, contempt
order should be dismissed); A. L. Sloan (unreported)
EDiTOR & PuB.isFm, Jan. 9, 1932, at 7 (no contempt
citation since Sloan had no evidence not already avail-
able to the prosecution).
"See note 40 supra.
6Blasi, NATION.
"408 U.S. at 706.65Id.
66 Blasi, NATION, at 199.
6In re Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist. Ct. 475 (1914) (it is
not within the power of the courts to add to the list of
privileged communications); People ex rel. Phelps v.
Fancher, 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1874) (privilege
must be created by legislative action); Note, 22 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 116, 119 (1936):
In a field so dominated by the social interest, which
the legislatures rather than the courts are supposed
to reflect, judical legislation would seem particu-
larly undesirable.
cf. In re Pappas, - Mass. at -, 266 N.E.2d at 302
(adoption of first amendment theory called judicial
legislation). But cf. D'Alemberte, supra note 24, at 339
(any conditional privilege statute must depend on com-
petent judicial administration); Semeta, Journalist's
Testimonial Privilege, 9 CrvE.-MAR. L. REv. 311, 322
(1960) (privilege question should be left in the sound
discretion of the courts); Note, The Right of a Newsman,
supra note 37, at 83 (legislation is not the proper
method).
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right... to have compulsory process for ob-
taining of witnesses in his favor." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VI. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth
amendment applies to the states).
69 Comment, The Newsman's Privilege and the Con-
stitution, supra note 51, at 460.
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constitutionality of an absolute newsman's privi-
lege statute.70 In suggesting that federal legisla-
tion may be as broad as deemed necessary, and
that state courts may recognize an absolute privi-
lege, the White opinion does not intimate the ne-
cessity of a sixth amendment limitationY Indeed,
the Court seems to sanction the view that the
sixth amendment was adopted to guarantee the
defendant the same right of process as was pro-
vided at common law, and that, accordingly, the
constitutional right, like its common law counter-
part, is subject to statutory modification. 2 This
argument is unpersuasive. If an absolute statutory
privilege may be granted to newsmen, it can be
extended to other occupational groups." A consti-
tutional guarantee which is subject to substan-
tial legislative revision is a contradiction in terms.
In addition to the protections for the news media
explicitly articulated by the Court, two important
limitations on the Branzburg holding are implicit
in the factual situations presented for adjudica-
tion. First, each of the four cases involved grand
jury74 investigation of suspected criminal ac-
tivities.75 Since even the opponents of a newsman's
privilege recognize the rationale for a distinction,
7
5
70 Fifteen-month study conducted by the American
Civil Liberties Union, reported in N.Y. Times, Mar.
18, 1959, at 75, col. 1 (state privilege statutes are not
likely to survive constitutional test). Cf. Note, Reporter
Denied Privilege Against Disclosure of News Source, 20
Omo ST. L.J. 382, 383 (1959) (by withholding the
identity of his source, the journalist defeats the public
and private right of access to due process). But see Ex
parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953) (court
rejected argument that such statutes are unconstitu-
tional); Comment, The Newsman's Qualified Privilege,
supranote 14, at332 (it is apparent that such privileges
are constitutionally sound).
n 408 U.S. at 706.
72 Note, Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 38,
at 346 n. 131:
Although the Sixth Amendment grants the de-
fendant the right of compulsory process, that
Amendment was adopted to guarantee the de-
fendant the same right of process as that provided
the prosecution by common law. This right to
compulsory process does not override exemptions
from disclosure protected by... statutes ....
Cf. 8 J. WIG ORE, EvIDENcE 2191 (McNaughton rev-
1961). See generally Goldstein, The State and the Ac
cused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YArx L.J. 1149 (1960).
73 The situation would be otherwise, of course, if the
legislative power to grant an absolute newsman's privi-
lege were grounded in freedom of the press. Such is not
the argument. See note 72 supra.
74 The decision in Branzburg v. Hayes does not tech-
nically extend to trial situations. However, since the
public interest in a trial certainly equals the public in-
terest in a grand jury proceeding, this seems to be a
distinction without a difference.
75 408 U.S. at 667-79.
76 See, e.g., Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources
the Branzburg holding does not necessarily ex-
tend to civil actions.
In England today, reporters are not compelled
to disclose their sources in private litigation against
newspapers in the absence of "special circum-
stances."f Apparently, however, the English rule
of privilege does not extend to criminal or ad-
ministrative proceedings." A similar distinction
might be sustained in American law. Moreover, it
is doubtful whether the right to compulsory tes-
timony of witnesses guaranteed by the sixth
amendment extends to civil litigants; 79 there-
fore, an argument can be made in support of a
constitutional distinction between civil and crim-
inal actions. The force of this contention is nec-
essarily diminished, however, by the strong tradi-
tion of compulsory testimony in civil cases 0 and
Wigmore's contention that the due process clause
guarantees compulsory testimony in civil ac-
tions81
Proponents of a constitutional newsman's privi-
lege have suggested that news about public mat-
ters is more worthy of constitutional protection
than information about private affairs8 and that,
Under the First Amendment, 11 STAN. L. Rav. 541, 545
(1949); Note, 61 Macr. L. REv. 184, 186 (1962).
7See Georgius v. Vice Chancellor of Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1 K.B. 729 (1949); Lawsen & Harrison v.
Odhams Press, Ltd., 1 K.B. 129 (1949); Lyle-Samuel
v. Odhams, Ltd, 1 K.B. 135 (1920); Adams v. Fisher,
110 T.L.R. 537 (C.A. 1914); Plymouth Mutual Coop-
erative v. Traders Publishing Ass'n, Ltd., 1 K.B. 403
(1906); Hope v. Brash, 2 Q.B. 188 (1897); Pope-Hen-
nessy v. Wright, 24 Q.B.D. 445 (1888); Horle v. Cathe-
dral, 14 L.T.1. 801 (1866).78 D'Alemberte, supra note 24, at 311 & n.19.
79 Guest & Standler, supra note 53, at 51:
In such cases as Time, Inc. v. Hill [385 U.S. 374
(1967)] the Supreme Court indicated its willingness
to sacrifice an individual's interest in recovery for
society's strong interest in freedom of the press.
Comment, Government Investigations, supra note 38, at
1227; Note, 72 HARv. L. Rxv. 768, 769 (1959); Note,
MARQ. L. Rav., supra note 60, at 189; Note, 61 Micn.
L. Rxv. 184, 185 n.5 (1962). Cf. Comment, Confidential-
ify of News Sources, supra note 14, at 1097 n.1321.80 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d at 549:
[A]t the foundation of the Republic the obligation
of a witness to testify and the correlative right of a
litigant to enlist judicial compulsion of testimony
were recognized as incidents of the judicial power
of the United States.
Cf. United, States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950);
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Blair v.
United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-81 (1919).
818 J. WIGMo RE, EVIDENCE § 2191 (iMcNaughton
rev. 1961). Cf. Beaver, seupra note 3, at 257:
[it is difficult to single out anything more funda-
mental to the guarantee of due process of law pro-
vided by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
8 D'Alemberte, supra note 24, at 338; Note, 82
HAv. L. REv. 1384, 1386 (1969).
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accordingly, greater protection in the form of a
newsman's privilege is appropriate in the former
situation.N Paradoxically, should the Supreme
Court eventually uphold a higher degree of pro-
tection for the reporter in civil actions,8 ' the dis-
tinction will probably be based on the contention
that the lesser public interest in private litigation
justifies greater constitutional protection for the
newsman.85 In summary, the Branzburg holding
is limited by its facts to criminal investigation.
Particular arguments-the analogy to English
law, the sixth amendment distinction, and the
greater public interest in criminal cases-justify
the conclusion that the Branzburg holding should
not be extended to civil litigation.
The holding in Branzburg v. Hayes is further
limited to the denial of a testimonial privilege at
the threshold of a grand jury investigation, with
one narrow exception.8 6 The decision does not
preclude the successful assertion of a constitu-
tional privilege after the grand jury has had an
opportunity to frame specific questions. Although
not expressly recognized in the White opinion,'
this limitation inheres in the factual situations
presented for judicial review.
Reporters Pappas, Caldwell and Branzburg
each claimed a constitutional right to refuse to
appear before the grand jury until the govern-
ment had met certain preconditions. Owing to
the threshold nature of the claim, the record pre-
1 Note, Reporter Denied Privilege, supra note 70, at
383 n.8. Cf. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 54.
84 See Chicago Daily News, Jan. 15, 1973, at 7, col. 2.
85 Throughout the majority opinion in Branzburg,
primary emphasis is placed on the public interest in the
detection of crime. See, e.g., the discussion of mis-
prision. 408 U.S. at 696. Cf. the following remarks made
by President Nixon at a recent press conference:
[WI]hen you go to the question of revealing sources,
then I take a very jaundiced view of that kind of
action. Unless, unless it is strictly--and this would
be a very narrow area-strictly in the area where a
major crime had been committed and where the
subpoenaing of the notes had to do with informa-
tion dealing directly with that crime.
N.Y. Times, May 2, 1971, at 66, col. 3.
86 See text accompanying note 96 infra.
87 Note, however, the following language from Justice
Powell's concurring opinion:
The newsman witness, like all other witnesses, will
have to appear .... Moreover, absent the consti-
tutional preconditions that Caldwell and that dis-
senting opinion would impose as heavy burdens of
proof to be carried by the State, the court-when
called upon to protect a newsman from improper or
prejudicial questioning-would be free to balance
the competing interests on their merits in the par-
ticular case.
408 U.S. at 710 n.*.
88 See Blasi, NATION.
sented to the High Court in Pappas was meager.
The nature of the grand jury investigation was
not ascertained; the questions Pappas would be
asked to answer were unknown. Indeed, it was
not even clear that he would be asked to divulge
information received in confidence 8 9 In Caldwell,
the Supreme Court had an opportunity8 ' to re-
view the propriety of an underlying protective
order which narrowed the scope of permissible
grand jury interrogation. 9' Instead, the Court
chose to limit its ruling to the immediate question
of whether or not Caldwell could refuse to pre-
sent himself before the grand jury. 2
The two cases involving petitioner Branzburgg3
differ from Caldwell and Pappas in that Branz-
burg was protected by the Kentucky reporter's
privilege statute." The Kentucky court of ap-
peals ruled that this statute does not prevent
compelling a reporter to identify the perpetrators
of a crime which he has witnessed. 5 Inasmuch
as Branzburg was otherwise immune from com-
pulsory testimony, the issue on appeal was nar-
rowly and specifically framed. In denying the
asserted privilege, therefore, the Supreme Court
went beyond the question of threshold require-
ments. However, since the public interest in effec-
tive law enforcement is particularly compelling
when the reporter has witnessed a crime, the ruling
does not necessitate the denial of a privilege in
other contexts. With this narrow exception, the
holding in Branzburg v. Hayes merely restricts the
reporter's right to challenge "the state's very au-
thority to subpoena him."'
96
The preceding analysis of the holding in Branz-
burg v. Hayes may be summarized as follows: In
the absence of statutory protection, a reporter
may not assert a testimonial privilege at the thresh-
89 408 U.S. at 709.
90 Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources, supra
note 14, at 1083 n.1246.
9" See note 15 supra.
82 "Other issues were urged upon us, but since they
were not passed upon by the Court of Appeals, we de-
dine to address them in the first instance." 408 U.S.
at 708.
93 See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
4Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 421.100 (1962).
95 461 S.W.2d at 345.
96 408 U.S. at 710 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). Cf.
Blasi, NATION:
The Powell opinion, which it must be stressed again
is the controlling opinion, leaves open the possi-
bility that newsmen in positions such as Caldwell,
Branzburg and Pound found themselves might yet
be privileged to keep important source confidences
intact if they cooperated with grand jury probes
up to a point.
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old of a grand jury investigation into criminal
activities, provided that the subpoena was issued
in good faith to procure relevant information.
ir. THE NEwsmAN'S PRIVILEGE IN HisToRIcAL
PERSPECTIVE
Liberty, in each of its phases, has its history
and connotation.
Near v. Minnesota"
The long and relentless struggle waged by news-
men seeking a privilege of confidential communi-
cation traces back to the days of Benjamin Frank-
lin's apprenticeship in the newspaper business."
In the course of two hundred years, the newsman
has been defeated on every conceivable ground.
9
One commentator has characterized the fifth
amendment privilege as "a doctrine in search of a
reason;"' the newsman's privilege is best char-
acterized as a reason in search of a doctrine.
The Newsman's Privilege as a Comwn Law Right
A privilege, in its Latin derivation, is a privy
law, granting a special favor or immunity. In a
sense, it is the opposite of a law, which is equally
applicable to all.101 A testimonial privilege is in
derogation of the doctrine that the public has a
right to every man's evidence'0 Accordingly, it
is appropriate to begin an historical analysis of
the newsman's privilege with a discussion of the
origin and nature of this doctrine.
The duty to testify was recognized early in the
development of English law.'' By the Act of Eliza-
beth in 1562, service of process could be had out
of any court of record requiring the person served
to testify concerning any cause pending in the
court. 14 In the Countess of Shrewsbury's Case in
1612, Lord Bacon proclaimed that "all subjects,
- 283 U.S. 697, 798 (1931).
9 THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY Or BENIJmn FR xLIN 69
(Yale Univ. Press 1964).
19 Comment, The Newsman's Qualified Privilege,
supra note 14, at 348.
0 W. ScHAFFER, THE SuspEcT AND SOCIzT 61
(1967).
101 Beaver, supra note 3, at 245.
"0 The policy of the law is to require the disclosure
of all information by witnesses in order that
justice may prevail. The granting of a privilege
from such disclosure constitutes an exception to
that rule.




See 1 IV. HoLswoRTH, A HISTORY or ENGLISH
LAW, 325-26 (7th ed. 1966); 5 W. HoLUswoRTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 192-93 (7th ed. 1966);
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1919).
104 5 Eliz., c. 9 § 12 (1562).
without distinction of degrees, owe to the King
tribute and service, not only of their deed and
hand, but of their knowledge and discovery."'105
Wigmore suggests that the duty to testify was
reinforced by the glorious revolution of 1688,106
and by 1843 Jeremy Bentham was able to assert
that not even the Prince of Wales could refuse to
testify if properly summoned by a chimney-sweeper
or a barrow-woman.""
The maxim that the public has a right to every
man's testimony is equally engrained in the Amer-
ican judicial system. In criminal cases, the right
to compulsory process is guaranteed by the sixth
amendment; in civil cases, the right probably in-
heres in fifth amendment due process 0 Moreover,
as the Supreme Court noted in Blair v. United
States,109 the compulsion of witnesses is recognized
as incident to the judicial power of the United
States.
Judicial emphasis on the duty to testify is jus-
tified by two considerations. First, the right to
sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of
force. Since the peaceful settlement of disputes
demands that individuals disclose their knowledge
of relevant matter, the testimonial duty is "a
natural and elementary obligation which must be
met if our judicial system is to function in... an
orderly manner."" 0 In this respect, the duty to
testify is conceived as a duty owed not to any one
person or set of persons, but to the community
as a whole.m
10 12 Coke 94 (1613). See also Bulstrud v. Letch-
mere, Freem. Ch. 5 (1676); Lord Grey's Trial, 9 How.
St. Tr. 127 (1682).
106 8 J. WXIGMORE, EVDmENCE §§ 2190-97 (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961).
101 4 TM WoRxs or JEREiy BEm 320 (Bowring
ed. 1843).
"1
8 See notes 80 & 81 supra. But cf. note 79 supra.
109 250 U.S. at 279-81. Cf. Garland v. Torre, 259
F.2d at 548 (duty to testify "has roots fully as deep in
our history as does the guarantee of a free press.");
Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 361 (1938)
(witness may be punished for mistakes of law in refus-
ing to answer). But see Comment, Gvernment Investiga-
lions, supra note 38, at 1218-19:
The interest in compelling testimony has never
been as "fundamental" or "paramount" as these
courts assumed. Both common law and statute
have long recognized numerous privileges against
compelled testimony, and if these same cases had
arisen in a statutory newsman's privilege state, the
courts would have applied the privilege, any "fun-
damental" or "paramount" interest notwithstand-
ing.
no Note, MARQ. L. REv., supra note 60, at 184; cf.
Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U.S. 142,
148 (1907); Bennet v. Waller, 23 Ill. 97, 101 (1859).
m Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438




A second justification for emphasis on the tes-
timonial duty stems from the basic concept that
courts of justice must be armed with the power
to discover truth. 12 It has been said that the mani-
fest destiny of the law of evidence is a progressive
lowering of the barriers to truth."
3 Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, trial lawyers have vociferously
attacked even the traditional testimonial priv-
ileges.114
The modern requisites for the establishment of a
common law privilege are embodied in Wigmore's
classic formula:
(1) The communications must originate in a confi-
dence thet they will not be disclosed. (2) The ele-
ment of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation be-
tween the parties. (3) The relation must be one
which in the opinion of the community ought to
be seduosly fostered. (4) The injury that would
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.'
Wigmore's criteria have been approved in a num-
ber of judicial decisions." 6 Even where the courts
are not explicit in citing Wigmore, the grounds
which they give for denying the testimonial priv-
ilege invariably indicate a failure to meet at least
one of the four conditions.j
7
The common law recognizes a privilege for the
[Tihe right merely happens to be exemplified in
the case of Doe v. Roe; that is all. The whole life
of the community, the regularity and continuity of
its relations, depend upon the coming of the wit-
ness.
1 Sec People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226,
230-31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874); People ex rd. Foote v.
Clark, 283 Ill. 221, 119 N.E. 329 (1918); Barnhart,
Theory of Testinonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK.
L. REv. 377 (1950) (accent of the law is upon percep-
tion, knowledge, authenticity); STAFF OFl SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE
NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE (Comm. Print 1966).
"' 1cConRMICK, EVIDENCE 165 (1954).
"1 See, e.g., CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COM-
MUNICATiONS 496 (1947) (trend of the best legal judg-
ment is away from all occupational privileges); CON-
RAD, 2 MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE 256 (1956); 1949
N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N REP. 130 (scarcely a
single presently recognized privilege of concealing the
truth that will bear rational analysis); Gallup, Further
Consideration of a Privilege for Newsmen, 14 ALBANY
L. REV. 16 (1950); Note, 39 NOTRE DAix LAWYER 489,
492 (1964).
"' 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton
rev. 1961) (emphasis in original).
"1 See, e.g., United States v. Funk, 84 F. Supp. 967
(1949); Scolavino v. State, 187 Misc. 253, 62 N.Y.S.2d
17 (Ct. Cl. 1946); State v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161,
169 P.2d 706 (1946).
117 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53. at 26 n.46.
attorney-client relationship,"' for husband and
wife,"' for child and parent,
2' for government
informers, 121 and for fellow jurors."' In addition,
most state legislatures have added doctor-pa-
tient'2 and priest-penitent 24 to the list. In each
instance, the privilege of nondisclosure is pur-
portedly justified as a prophylactic device to in-
sure full effectuation of a socially desirable rela-
tionship." 5
The newsman's privilege is often dismissed as a
novelty,"6 and the large majority of common law
decisions have denied the reporter's request for
privilege.' 7 The case most often cited in this con-
"'See Drolshagen v. Drolshagen, 230 Mich. 444,
202 N.W. 959 (1925); Rooney v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 184 Mass. 26, 67 N.E. 882 (1903); Getzlaff v.
Seliger, 43 Wis. 297 (1877); Dennis v. Codrington, Cary
143 (Ch. 1580) (a counsellor is not to be examined of
any matter, wherein he hath been of counsel); Berd v.
Lovelace, Cary 88 (Ch. 1577) (soliciter exempted from
examination). See generally Symposium, Evidentiary
Privileges in Illinois-Attorney Client Privilege, 46 CH.-
KENT L. REv. 35 (1969); Note, Functional Overlap
Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its lmplica-
tions for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71
YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
"' See State v. Robbins, 33 Wash. 2d 370, 213 P.2d
310 (1950); People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d
172 (1940); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900,
55 S.E.2d 9 (1940); Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342
(1897). See generally Guarnieri, Husband-Wife Privileged
Communications, Summarized, 8 Cr.LEv.-MAR. L. REV.
531 (1959).
1' See generally Coburn, Child-Parent Communica-
tion: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK.
L. REV. 599 (1970).
2'Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); 8
J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE §2374 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
32 Burns International Detective Agency v. Holt,
138 Minn. 165, 164 N.W. 590 (1917); Ward Baking Co.
v. Western Union, 205 App. Div. 723, 200 N.Y. Supp.
865 (1923).
" See Note, NOTRE DAME LAWYER, supra note 114,
at 490. See generally C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNI-
CATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT (1958);
Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical
Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv. 175 (1960); Stewart, Physi-
cian-Patient Privilege in Ohio, 8 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV.
444 (1959); Welch, Another Anomaly-The Patient's
Privilege, 13 Miss. L.J. 137 (1941).
' Note, NOTRE DME LAWYER, supra note 114, at
490. See generally 8 J. VIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2395
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
1 Coburn, supra note 120, at 603. See generally Mor-
gan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testi-
mnony by Rudes of Evidence, 10 U. Cm. L. REv. 285
(1943); Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and
Forward at Evidence, 50 HAv. L. Rxv. 909 (1937);
Platz, Various Privileges, -1945 Wis. L. REv. 239; Note,
Privileged Communications-Sonze Recent Developments,
5 VAND. L. REv. 590 (1952).1 6 See, e.g., 63 ABA REPORTS 570, 595 (1938).
127 See, e.g., In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011
(1913). For a comprehensive list of those cases which
have refused to recognize a common law privilege for
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nection is People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New
York County,"3 wherein the court maintained
that the "policy of the law is to require the dis-
closure of all information by witnesses in order
that justice may prevail." Before concluding, how-
ever, that the common law door to a newsman's
privilege is closed," 9 it is important to note that
the arguments heretofore presented to the courts
have failed to present the newsman's case in its
most favorable light and that the common law
courts have not been altogether unresponsive to
the reporter's needs.
In presenting his case before the common law
courts, the newsman has most often stressed the
dictates of the Newspaper Code of Ethics as jus-
tification for a testimonial privilege."' Courts
which have considered the contention, however,
have unanimously given priority to legal con-
siderations over ethical rules.'3' Proponents of a
newsman's privilege have also urged that a tes-
timonial privilege is essential to the economic
survival of the newsman because compulsory
testimony disrupts the confidential relationships
upon which his trade depends."' Economic hard-
ship is not recognized, however, as a viable grounds
for granting a privilege."' By stressing ethical
considerations and economic loss before the com-
mon law courts, the news media has virtually
invited the rejection of a journalist's privilege.
It is suggested that the courts would respond
favorably to a more compelling rationale.13
Even though no reported case has sustained
the desired privilege,' the common law courts
newsmen, see In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii
317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
US 269 N.Y. 291, 295, 199 N.E. 415, 416 (1935).
329 Comment, The Newsman's Privilege and the Con-
stitution, supra note 51, at 466:
Despite the plausibility of the argument that the
newsman has a common law privilege to conceal
his source of information, there seems to be little
hope that a court would ever accept the argument.
Cf. Beaver, supra note 3, at 246 n.7.
no W. A anm & R. CRossm , THE LAw or NEws-
pAPERs (2d ed. 1940).
3 D'Alemberte, supra note 24, at 315. See, e.g., In re
Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist. Ct. 475 (1914). Cf. Owens v.
Frank, 7 Wyo. 457, 53 P. 282 (1898) (no privilege for
Free Masons who have taken a sacred oath of secrecy);
Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 573 (1776)
(early English "Point of Honour" doctrine abandoned).
See generally, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1111 (1960) (notes
that ethical arguments have ceased to be persuasive as
a defense for not testifying).




3 Id.; 8 J. WiGmoRE, EvmENcE § 2192 (NcNaugh-
ton rev. 1961).
I See text accompanying notes 279-92 infra.
215 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 18.
have shown a marked solicitude for the plight of
the reporter. This concern is demonstrated by
several considerations. First, many common law
courts have refused to compel a newsman to reveal
his source when the identity was of doubtful rel-
evance to the pending action.'36 Second, numer-
ous cases dismissing contempt charges on tech-
nicalities illustrate a certain judicial reluctance to
cite the newsman for contempt when this even-
tuality can be conveniently avoided."7 Third,
many of the lower courts have countenanced the
newsman's refusal to testify without expressly
recognizing a testimonial privilege."' Fourth, the
common law concern for the press is manifest in
the meager punishments meted out to obdurate
reporters: contempt penalties are often limited
to modest fines,"39 which will probably be paid
by the newsman's employer,140 and jail sentences
have been minimal."' Finally, several unreported
decisions"' have granted the newsman's privi-
lege."'
116 See, e.g., Parnell v. Walter, 6 T.L.R. 138 (1890)
(in action for libel where only issue was one of damages,
plaintiff could not compel defendant to reveal the
source). See also cases cited note 61 supra.
U7 Note, The Right of a Newsman, supra note 37, at
74. See, e.g., People ex re. Clarke v. Truesdell, 79
N.Y.S.2d 413 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (reporters were released
in habeas corpus proceedings when the order of com-
mitment was found to be technically defective).
=See Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Print. & Pub. Co.,
82 N.J. Super. 269, 270, 197 A.2d 416, 417 (1964);
Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 31 (in New York
State, the privilege is recognized not by law but by
tacit agreement); Note, Privilege of Newspapermen to
Withhold Sources of Information from; the Court, 45
YALE L.J. 357, 359 (1935).
19 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 3, at 47 n.145;
Note, The Journalist and His Confidential Source, supra
note 16, at 579. See, e.g., In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235,
85 A. 1011 (1913), where the reporter was fined $25.
240 N.Y. Times, June 29, 1966, at 23, col. 1. The
newsman's employer may be able to deduct the amount
as a cost of doing business. Comment, Government In-
vestigations, supra note 38, at 1201 n.11.
" Sentences have been as long as ten days. Com-
ment, Government Investigations, supra note 38, at 1201
n.11. The jail is made as pleasant as possible for news-
men. EniOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 4, 1934, at 3 (re-
porters allowed to work their normal hours and spend
off-duty hours in jail); Guest & Stanzler, supra note
53, at 47 n.145 (in the Newburgh News case, reporters
were allowed to receive calls and presents-including a
cake with a file protruding through the icing-and to
write news stories from their cells).
" It should be noted that the great majority of cases
on this subject are not reported. Note, The Right of a
Newsman, supra note 37, at 61 n.3. The reason, perhaps,
is that the government seldom appeals newsman's
privilege cases. Cf. text accompanying note 270 infra.
One commentary warns that unreported cases are taken
from press news sources and, accordingly, should be
used with caution. STAFr or SENATE, supra note 112,
at 55.
Frank L. Toughill (unreported) EDIToR & PuB-
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COMMENT
The Newsman's Privilege as a Constitutional Guar-
antee
Constitutionally, truth is not an end in itself.'"
The duty to testify is subject to mitigation, the
most conspicuous illustration being the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.'"'
Indeed, from the standpoint of the law of evidence,
the fifth amendment constitutes the primary ob-
struction to the efficient operation of the judicial
system.
4 6
In the 1915 case of Burdick v. United States,'
a news editor refused to testify on the ground that
disclosure of his source would tend to incriminate
him. Further, Burdick refused to accept an ex-
ecutive pardon granted by President Wilson,
arguing that acceptance constituted an implicit
admission of guilt.'" Writing for the District Court,
Judge Learned Hand upheld Burdick's contempt
citation, noting that it "would be preposterous
to let him keep on suppressing the truth."'49 The
Supreme Court, however, in a unanimous opinion
by Mr. Justice McKenna, reversed the Hand
decision and upheld Burdicks's right to refuse the
pardon. Technically, the Burdick decision turned
on the distinction between immunity and pardon:
A news reporter cannot refuse to testify where he
lasHER, Dec. 9, 1933, at 16 (privilege granted prior to
adoption of Pennsylvania privilege statute); T. Norman
Palmer (unreported) EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 24,
1935, at 6:
This court recognizes the right of a newspaperman
to refrain from divulging sources of his information.
If you feel that in doing this [taking the stand], it
may interfere with this right you are at liberty not
to take the stand at this time.
Nat Cadwell (unreported) N.Y. Times, June 1, 1948,
at 25, col. 7; EDITOR & PUBOLISHER, May 29, 1948, at
59; EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June 5, 1948, at 64. The
opinion of the county court is set out in New York Law
Revision Commission, Legis. Doc. 65 (A) 65 (1949),
quoted in Note, The Journalist and His Confidential
Source, supra note 16, at 576 n.42:
The press must get its information thru others, of
necessity much is given in confidence, and I am
unable to hold the witness in contempt of this
matter. It's true it is hard to have serious charges
made against public officials on hearsay evidence,
but at times much good has been done in that way.
These cases give unmistakable effect to the defense of
privilege in the absence of statute. Note, The Right of
a Newsman, supra note 37, at 70-71 & n.63.
"'Goldstein, Newsmen and Their Confidential Sources,
162 THz NEW REPUBLic 13, 14 (1970).
145 "1d.
146 Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The
Case For Constitutional Change, 37 U. CrNN. L. REv.
671 (1968).
' 236 U.S. 79 (1914).
1 See Beaver, supra note 3, at 254.
"4 211 F. 492, 494 (D.N.Y. 1913).
has been granted immunity."01 Nonetheless, since
it is "inconceivable" that Burdick was involved
in committing the very crimes he had done more
than any other man to expose,151 the decision is
notable as an early illustration of Supreme Court
sympathy for the newsman's plight.152
The constitutional claim to a newsman's tes-
timonial privilege urged in Branzburg v. Hayes
is of comparatively recent origin. Until 195815
the proponents of a privilege for journalists em-
phasized the common law claim.'M Moreover, even
when a constitutional claim was asserted, it was
premised on the fifth amendment rather than the
first.155
In its contemporary form, the constitutional
argument emphasizes the theory that a privilege
protecting confidential news sources is necessary
to assure the free flow of information guaranteed
by the first amendment. 156 Initial judicial response
to this argument was mixed. A majority of courts
rejected the privilege,U although dicta in some
decisions indicated that a right of nondisclosure
might be appropriate in circumstances not pre-
sented. - ' A growing minority of courts, however,
sustained the desired privilege, 15 and the re-
sultant uncertainty necessitated the Supreme
Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.6 '
Inasmuch as the "flow of information" theory
had not been previously examined by the Supreme
Court, the relevant precedents are to be found in
general first amendment doctrine. Before re-
110 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Mills v.
Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959).
"5 CE -EE, supra note 114, at 497.
"'See N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1915, at 6, col. 3; cf.
A. L. Sloan (unreported) EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug.
11, 1934, at 10 (contempt charges dropped when re-
ported pleaded the fifth); CRAFEE, supra note 114, at
497 (judges quick to give reporter fifth amendment
escape from contempt citation).
"I The first case to assert the first amendment argu-
ment was Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
1 4 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 18.
"'5 The fifth amendment privilege is clearly distin-
guishable from a right asserted under the first amend-
ment. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
1"' The argument was brought to national attention
by the Guest & Stanzler article cited supra note 53.
157 See, e.g., In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181
(1963); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729,
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
1" See cases cited at 408 U.S. 686.
159 For a comprehensive listing of those cases finding
a constitutional privilege, see Note, Reporters and Their
Sources, supra note 38, at 318 n.7.
160 Numerous legal commentators had called for a
Supreme Court decision on whether a constitutional
newsman's privilege exists. See, e.g., Beaver, supra note
3; Carter, supra note 131; Goldstein, supra note 144.
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viewing these precedents, however, it is necessary
to elaborate on the contemporary theory. Basi-
cally, the argument is as follows: (1) The first
amendment protects the free flow of information
to the public; (2) any restriction of the flow of
information is inconsistent with first amendment
guarantees; (3) compulsory testimony impairs
confidence in reporters and dries up sources of
information, and thereby restrains newsgather-
ing and restricts the free flow of information to the
public; (4) first amendment guarantees have a
special constitutional status and cannot be re-
stricted unless justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest; (5) the state interest in com-
pulsory testimony is not compelling in the case of
the journalist; and (6) therefore, the Constitution
guarantees a testimonial privilege for newsmen.
The first premise in the contemporary theory is
that the first amendment protects the free flow of
information to the public. A substantial body of
evidence demonstrates that the first amendment
was intended to reflect the early American belief
that where the press is free, "everyone will live
in the light."' Moreover, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized that a free press is
vital to an informed public.1 12 As articulated by
the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC:'
It is the purpose of the first amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail. It is the right of the public
to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas which is crucial
here. That right may not be constitutionally
abridged....
More specifically, the proponents of a news-
man's privilege urge that the right to a confidential
relationship should be derived from the right to
gather information.'6 Prior to Branzburg v. Hayes,
the question whether the process of newsgathering
is within the ambit of the freedom of the press
was a matter of considerable dispute. On the one
hand, there is no indication in the writings of the
times that the framers and backers of the Bill of
Rights intended to include newsgathering among
1'6 Wxzs, THE OuTLIvE OF HISTORY 888 (1949).
162 See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965);
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 253, 270 (1964);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
Indeed, it would be difficult to find a case where this
idea is not expressed. Comment, Government Inrestiga-
tionis, supra note 38, at 1234 n.197.
1 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
"A Comment, Tie Newsman's Privilege and the Con-
stitution, supra note 51, at 449.
the protections afforded to the press."65 Dismissing
the contrary suggestion as a "superstructure sup-
ported by assertion only, 166 numerous courts
concluded that the first amendment does not
extend to the gathering of the news.63 On the
other hand, certain writers urged that newsgath-
ering should be included among those protections
reserved to the people by the tenth amendment.'6
Further, a growing number of legal commenta-
tors 69 expressed support for the thesis enunciated
in Justice Musmanno's dissenting opinion in In
re Mack: "Freedom of the press means freedom
to gather news, write it, publish it, and circulate
it. When any one of these integral operations is
interdicted, freedom of press becomes a river
without water."'7 0 This argument garnered wide-
spread judicial supportn and was seemingly ac-
cepted in Branzburg v. Hayes. In the words of Mr.
Justice White, "without some protection for seek-
ing out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated."1 72
The second premise in the newsman's theory is
that any restriction on the flow of information is
inconsistent with first amendment guarantees.
This premise is logically sound only if the first
amendment protects every means of stimulating
the flow of information to the public and the free-
dom of the press extends to every activity which
assists in the gathering of the news. These prop-
ositions are of questionable validity. If the Con-
stitution protected every means of increasing
public awareness, virtually every statutory enact-
ment would be subject to the first amendment
compelling interest test'"' since the imposition of a
penalty for violation of a statute ipso facto dis-
courages violators from openly discussing their
165 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 31.
166 Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254
F.2d 883, 884 (3rd Cir. 1958).
167 See, e.g., United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y.
71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954). Cf. Seymour v. Untied
States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
"6 See, e.g., V. DOUGLAs, THE RIGirr OF THE PEOPLE
81 (1958) Cf. M. KoNvI=z, Fu 'MENTAL LIBERTIES
OF A FREE PEOPLE 192-93 (1957); F. THAYER, LEGAL
CONTROL OF THE PRESS 178 (3rd ed. 1956).
*369 See Comment, Government Investigaions, supra
note 38, at 1225; Comment, 11 STAN. L. Rxv. 541, 543
(1959); Note, Reporters and Their Sources, supra note
38, at 328.
170 386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (Musmanno,
J., dissenting).
"'See, e.g., Associated Press v. Kvos, Inc., 80 F.2d
575 (19th Cir. 1935), rev'd onjuris, grounds, 299 U.S. 269
(1936); Brannan v. State, 29 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1947);
Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
172 408 U.S. at 681.
7 See text accompanying notes 221-25 infra.
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acts. If the freedom of the press encompassed all
means of gathering the news, little or no protection
could be afforded for the privacyof the individual.I4
Not surprisingly, constitutional claims premised
on the "free flow of information" theory have
encountered increasing judicial resistance. In
Zemel v. Rusk 175 the Supreme Court sustained the
Government's refusal to validate passports to
Cuba even though the restriction rendered "less
than wholly free the flow of information con-
cerning that country." 76 In support of the decision,
Mr. Chief Justice Warren observed that there
are few restrictions on action which could not be
clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of de-
creased data flow.P Similarly, the Supreme Court
in Kleindienst v. Mande 78 upheld the denial of a
temporary nonimmigrant visa to a Belgian jour-
nalist and Marxist theoretician who had been
invited to participate in academic conferences
and discussions. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice
Blackmun dismissed the notion that denying the
visa would restrict the spectrum of available knowl-
edge by noting that not every such restriction is
contrary to the Constitution 7 9
The same consideration is central to the majority
decision in Branzburg v. Hayes. Thus, Justice
White observed that:
Although stealing documents or private wiretap-
ping could provide newsworthy information,
neither reporter nor source is immune from con-
viction for such conduct, whatever the impact on
the flow of the news."'
174 Legislation protecting privacy could be passed by
the congress, of course, but such legislation would have
to survive the compelling interest test applicable to
first amendment freedoms. Cf. Blasi, The Newsman's
Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MicH. L. R.v. 229,
232 (1971):
One cannot... resolve the press subpoena con-
troversy by mindlessly looking to "progressive"
legal thought because, as with the cases concerning
the privacy tort and trial publicity, the "progres-
sive" trends are on a collision course.
5 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
76 Id. at 16.
17 Id. at 17:
[Tihe prohibition of unauthorized entry into the
White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities
to gather information he might find relevant to his
opinion of the way the country is being run, but
that does not make entry into the White House a
First Amendment right.
' 408 U.S. 753 (1972). Since Kleindienst v. Mandel
was decided after Branzburg v. Hayes, it does not con-
stitute a precedent for the Branzburg decision. The
Mandel case is included, however, because it illustrates
an emerging judicial attitude toward the "free flow of
the news theory."
"9 408 U.S. at 768.
180 408 U.S. at 691.
Admittedly, the proponents of the "free flow of
the news theory" have not contended that the
results depicted by Justice White should be coun-
tenanced. It might be suggestd, therefore, that
the theory is valid insofar as it provides limited
protection for news sources and invalid only when
pushed to an extreme. The classic rebuttal is
contained in John Stewart Mill's essay On Liberty:
Strange it is, that men should admit the validity of
the arguments..., but object to their being
"pushed to an extreme;" not seeing that unless
the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are
not good for any case."'
Not all restrictions on the flow of information to
the public are contrary to the first amendment.
Accordingly, the mere demonstration of a re-
striction on the flow of the news does not estab-
lish the existence of a first amendment interest.
This fact constitutes the fatal flaw in an otherwise
persuasive chain of reasoning.
The third link in the newsman's theory is that
compulsory testimony burdens the free flow of
information to the public. The asserted burden
has three dimensions. First, the denial of a priv-
ilege reduces the willingness of informants to seek
out and communicate with newsmen."' Second,
the fear of forced disclosure compels the reporter
to avoid controversy and hardship by tempering
his reporting to reduce the possibility that he will
be required to submit to interrogation." Finally,
the press is encouraged to destroy all documents
which might be demanded under compulsion of
subpoena duces tecum."P
The magnitude of the asserted burden on the
flow of the news is a matter of considerable con-
troversy. Opponents of the privilege contend that
any interference is less than de minimis"15 and
181 J. M=uL, ON LmERxT 39 (1859).
"2Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 44. See gen-
erally Goldstein, supra note 144, passim.
"'Comment, Government Investigations, supra note
38, at 1208 n.43; Imprisoned Press, supra note 44:
The extension of that principle [forced testimony]
could make the press a prime instrument in muz-
zling itself and forfeiting its power of independent
inquiry.
I'l It has become common for newspapers and tele-
vision stations to destroy all their unpublished film in
order to avoid having it available for production under
compulsion of subpoenas duces tecum. Comment, Gov-
ernment Investigations, supra note 38, at 1208 n.44;
Caldwell, supra note 44:
I ripped up the notebooks, I erased the tapes and
shredded almost every document that I had that
dealt with the Panthers. Many of those items
should have been saved, for history's sake, as much
as for anything.
185 Comment, Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsman's
Source, supra note 37, at 247.
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cite the following arguments in support of this
contention: (1) Inasmuch as the informant is
usually ignorant of any privilege for journalists,
denial of the privilege is not likely to inhibit con-
fidential sources;"86 (2) the information acquired
by newspapers by way of confidential communi-
cations is but a minor source of the great fountain
of news available to newspapers;"s' and (3) even
where confidential news sources are deterred, the
desired information can usually be obtained by
other means.1" The proponents of a newsman's
privilege have countered that if the rule of forced
disclosure is continued, the "entire stream of in-
formation will become shallow and polluted."'19
In support of this assertion, they argue that: (1)
The assurance of confidential treatment is essential
to the acquisition of news sources,"' and in specific
instances the fear of forced disclosure has silenced
previously cooperative informants;' 9' (2) vast
numbers of vital news stories are based on infor-
mation received in confidence; 192 and (3) without
confidential sources, the news would be little more
than a compendium of official propanganda and
press releases.
93
Given the difficulties inherent in obtaining
reliable data,9 4 various writers have tried to dem-
186 Beaver, supra note 3, at 252.
17 Id.; Note, Prvilege of Newspapermen to Withhold
Sources of Infornurtionfronx the Court, 45 YA.X L.J. 357,
360 (1935).
"2 Beaver, supra note 3, at 251 n.37; Note, Privilege
of Newspapermen, supra note 187.
129 House Subcommiltee Concludes, supra note 36.
"0 Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources, supra
note 14, at 1090 n.1281; Frankel, Mitchell aud Press
Problems, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1970, at 40, col. 4. The
most persuasive articulation of this argument is that
presented by Prof. R. E. Lance of Yale:
I am convinced that substantial doubt among re-
spondents about the confidential treatment of the
material offered in scholarly interviews, would in
the past have specifically reduced our knowledge of
communism in SouthernItaly, thepoliticsof Ghana
the military in Brazil, the perception of the Arab
cause in Lebanon, the attitudes toward war among
leaders of four major European powers, the atti-
tudes toward law held by convicted criminals in
our prisons, the operation of the Mayor's office in
New Haven, and much more.
Cited in Donner & Cerruti, supra note 34, at 19.
' See, e.g., Comment, The Newsman's Privilege and
the Constitution, supra note 51, at 458.
" See, e.g., H. SaMRwooD, TAE JouRNALisTic IN-
TERvIEw89 (1969); A. KRocK, Mmtonzs: Scrxi YEARS
oN = Fnu G Lnr- 181, 184-85 (1968); H. KuRY L,
B u nn Lms: THE Wo=R) op DRnw PEARsoN
50, 142 (1968).
Os Desmond, supra note 35, at 8.
"'Only two statistical studies have been made.
Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53; Blasi, supra note 174.
For the most part, these studies consist of an analytical
compilation of the opinions of various representatives
of the news media. Their value is impaired by three
onstrate the magnitude of the burden on the flow
of the news by indirect methods of proof. Oppo-
nents of the privilege have thus lauded the supe-
riority of the news reporting found in the New
York Times even though the State of New York
does not have a confidence statute for journalists.195
However, such an argument ignores the possibility
of even greater journalistic excellence were the
privilege granted.'96 Opponents of the privilege
have also emphasized the paucity of newsman's
privilege cases; the number of cases in which the
newsman's knowledge might be relevant is as-
sertedly so small in relation to the frequency with
which information is confidentially communicated
to a reporter that the danger of compulsory dis-
closure is negligible."7 Whether or not there is a
paucity of cases, however, the implications of such
a fact are highly ambiguous. It may indicate that
newsmen are rarely called upon to divulge confi-
dential sources, that confidential information is
rarely relevant to judicial proceedings, or that
newsmen seldom appeal contempt citations."6
Both opponents and proponents of the news-
man's privilege have attempted to justify their
stance by the fact that, historically, newsmen
have almost always refused to divulge the names
of their informants even under the threat of fine
and incarceration. 99 Two competing implications
can be drawn, however, from the willingness of
newsmen to go to jail to protect their sources. On
the one hand, it has been suggested that jour-
nalistic obstinacy supplants the need for con-
stitutional or statutory protection. °0 On the other
hand, one commentator has urged that it is time
to reconsider the rationale of a law "which evokes a
widespread spirit of civil disobedience among
journalists."''1 Moreover, if newsmen were not
factors. First, the individual reporter may not be capa-
ble of ascertaining the precise degree of chilling of con-
fidential relationships which is likely to ensue should he
be forced to testify. Second, the studies lack the objec-
tivity requisite to reliability since the persons inter-
viewed have a vested interest in the results. Finally,
newsmen often disagree over the proportion of articles
originating from confidential tips. Cf. 408 U.S. at 694.
19" See Semeta, supra note 67, at 320.
196 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 43.
1" See Gallup, supra note 114, at 21.
11' Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 44 n.134.
199 Only two cases have resulted in the newsman's
identification of his source after his citation for con-
tempt. In re Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist. Ct. 475 (1914);
Eddie Barr (unreported) N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1931, at
25, col. 8. But see Comment, Government Investigations,
supra note 38, at 1203 (suggesting that the recent rash
of subpoenas has led several newsmen to comply).
200 Se, e.g., Note, 61 IcH. L. Rxv. 184, 189 (1962).
211 D'Alembre, supra note 24, at 307.
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willing to face incarceration in such circumstances,
it is possible that sources of information would
dry up and that the free flow of the news would be
measurably impaired. 20
In the absence of reliable data, and given the
deficiencies of the indirect proofs just discussed,
the majority in Branzburg asserts that "the evi-
dence fails to demonstrate that there would be
a significant constriction of the flow of news to
the public if this Court reaffirms the prior com-
mon law and constitutional rule regarding the
testimonial obligations of newsmen."'2' Rejecting
this assertion, Justice Stewart contends that be-
cause of the Court's historic presumption in favor
of first amendment values, "[wie cannot await an
unequivocal-and therefore unattainable-impri-
matur from empirical studies."'' 2 The conflict in
views is explained by the fact that the two opinions
are addressing different issues. The majority is
ascertaining whether a first amendment interest
exists. Stewart, however, presupposes the existence
of a first amendment freedom and addresses the
question of the standard to be applied in deter-
mining whether or not governmental activity is
unconstitutionally restraining this freedom.
Some proponents of a newsman's privilege have
urged that, whatever the present impact of forced
testimony, the crucial consideration is that if the
power to compel testimony were used to the full
extent permissible there would be a serious burden
on the free flow of the news." 5 The underlying
rationale for this contention is that abuse of a
power is not necessary to attack its consti-
tutionality.206 As Justice Douglas urged in his
dissent in Poe v. Ulttnun 2 07 the tacit agreement
by prosecutors not to assert the power does not
not justify the existence of a power which, if as-
serted, would be unconstitutional.
The application of this doctrine is best per-
ceived through an examination of the controversy
surrounding the recently-issued Attorney General
guidelinesO' Designed to prevent a confrontation
21 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 47.
2"3 408 U.S. at 693.
204 Id. at 736.
205 See, e.g., Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53.
206 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 309
(1965) (concurring opinion); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 97 (1940), and cases cited therein.
2- 367 U.S. 497, 512 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
208 In requesting the Attorney General's authoriza-
tion for a subpoena, the following principles are to
apply:
A. There should be sufficient reason to believe that
a crime has occurred, from disclosures by non-press
sources. The Department does not approve of
which could seriously affect press relationships
with the federal government, the bar and the
courts,2" 9 the guidelines have reversed the prior
trend toward increased prosecutorial reliance on
the press.2 0 The Justice Department maintains
that a newsman's privilege is not necessary be-
cause of the protections thus afforded,21' and, in
part at least, this contention is given favorable
recognition by the majority in Branzburg12 The
adequacy of the guidelines in preventing abuse of
prosecutorial power, however, has been seriously
questioned. First, it is suggested that loopholes in
the guidelines render any meaningful protection
illusory; the guidelines give little indication of the
factors which are to be weighted in determining
whether to subpoena a reporter."' More important,
the guidelines are specifically discardable if "emer-
gencies and other unusual situations" should de-
utilizing the press as a springboard for investiga-
tions.
B. There should be sufficient reason to believe that
the information sought is essential to a successful
investigation-particularly with reference to di-
rectly establishing guilt or innocence. The subpoena
should not be used to obtain peripheral, non-essen-
tial or speculative information.
C. The Government should have unsuccessfully at-
tempted to obtain the information from alternative
non-press sources.
D. Authorization requests for subpoenas should
normally be limited to the verification of published
information and to such surrounding circum-
stances as relate to the accuracy of the published
information.
E. Great caution should be observed in requesting
subpoena authorization, or where an orthodox
First Amendment defense is raised or where a seri-
ous claim of confidentiality is alleged.
F. Even subpoena authorization requests for pub-
licly disclosed information should be treated with
care because, for example, cameramen have re-
cently been subjected to harassment on the
grounds that their photographs will become availa-
ble to the government.
G. In any event, subpoenas should, whenever pos-
sible, be directed at material information regarding
a limited subject matter, should cover a reasonably
limited period of time, and should avoid requiring
production of a large volume of unpublished ma-
terial. They should give reasonable and timely
notice of the demand for documents.
Guidelines of the AllorneyGeneral on Press Subpoenas, 39
U.S.L.W. 2111 (Aug. 25, 1970).
209 Former Attorney General Mitchell quoted in N.Y.
Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 24, col. 2.
210 See sources cited at note 38 supra.
211 House Snbco~nmitlee Concludes, supra note 36, at
2081.
212 408 U.S. at 707 n.41.




velop.2a4 Second, the negotiations implicit in the
guidelines involve a bargaining process in which
the weak will be pressured into divulging infor-
mation while the media giants will not.Y Finally,
since administrative guidelines may be changed
by the stroke of a pen,2' a vital aspect of freedom
of the press is dependent upon the "political mach-
inations within the Justice Department."
217
The primary weakness of the "potential abuse"
argument is that a newsman's privilege is also
susceptible to illegitimate use. Limited only by
the dubious restraint of his own zeal,2'8 the re-
porter who is immune from judicial subpoena
may indulge in muckraking, the dissemination of
untruthful scandal, and "circulation-seeking sen-
sationalism. 219 The fear that the privilege will
be abused by the press is exacerbated by the fact
that the logic of the free flow of the news argu-
ment dictates the granting of an absolute priv-
ilege. Thus, in the principal case, reporter Caldwell
urged that his mere appearance before the grand
jury would jeopardize his news relationships. Other
proponents of a newsman's privilege have as-
serted that if the privilege can be defeated for
any reason, it will not alleviate the chilling effect
on the flow of information.m°
The fourth link in the contemporary theory
supporting the privilege is that first amendment
guarantees have a special constitutional status
and cannot be restricted unless justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest. The validity of this
premise is not open to doubt. Although literally
214 Comment, Governnent Investigations, supra note
38, at 1249-50.
215 Goldstein, supra note 144, at 13.216Newsmen's Privilege Legislation Called Essential,
supra note 35, passim.
27 Id. at 2103.
=Cf. Semeta, supra note 67, at 317. Bat see J.
MADISON, REPORT ON THE ViRGrNiA RESOLUTIONS
(1800), in 4 J. ErxnoT, DEBATES ON FEDEAL
CoNsTrnnoN 571 (2d rev. ed. 1901):
[Slome degree of abuse is inseparable from the
proper use of everything; and in no instance is this
more true than in that of the press.
Cf. Barnhart, supra note 112, at 378 (dictates of sound
public policy survive even their abuse)..19 Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 CoLum. L.
REv. 388 (1906) (a privilege, if not an abuse in its in-
ception, is proverbially sure to become one); Note, 5
BROOKLYN L. REv. 215, 216 (1936) (privilege could
operate as a cloak for circulation-seeking sensational-
ism); Note, 34 Mcx. L. REv. 729, 731 (1936) (im-
munity would aid the expansion of muckraking); Note,
45 YA x L.J. 357 (1935) (privilege would open the way
to reckless publication). But see Guest & Stanzler,
supra note 53, at 41 (fear that privilege would shield
newspapers from libel actions a misconception).
'20 See Comment, Government Investigations, supra
Note 38, at 1236.
the first amendment restrains legislative rather
than judicial acts, the Supreme Court has rejected
this distinction.22 Similarly, although first amend-
ment freedoms are not absolute,22 the Supreme
Court has consistently held that only a compelling
state interest can justify their restriction. 23 In-
deed, a restraint on the press need not be direct
to be an abridgement under the Constitution,2 4
and the mere prospect of self-censorship of first
amendment activity is often sufficient to justify
holding the state activity unconstitutional.2 5
The final link in the contemporary "flow of
information" theory is that the state interest in
compulsory testimony is not compelling in the
case of the journalist. The Government has justified
press subpoenas by pointing to thedangerous ac-
tivities of which newsmen may have knowledge. 1
Unfortunately, this general characterization pro-
motes a blanket assertion of society's right to
testimony without looking behind the assertion in
an individual case to determine whether society's
interests in the due administration of justice are
actually promoted by enforcement of the prin-
ciple.m
Before examining the question of whether or
not compelling a reporter to testify furthers the
due administration of justice, a distinction be-
tween the two functions of the grand jury must
be drawn. As described in Hale v. Henkelm the
grand jury stands between the prosecutor and the
accused and investigates the possible commission
of crimes. Although compulsory disclosure is im-
portant in either case,21 9 the two functions should
not be accorded the same constitutional status.
As noted in Wood v. Georgia,230 the primary purpose
12 See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273
(1919); Note, 61 MicH. L. REv. 184, 188 n.18 (1962)
2m See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925).
2
n See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965);
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
2 See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
25 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56
(1965); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378
U.S. 205 (1964).
22 See Statement of Attorney General Mitchell, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1970, at 40, col. 4.
22 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 37.
s 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906).
229 Note, Reporters and Their Source, supra note 38,
at 319, n.11.
n0 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
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of the grand jury has historically been the pro-
tection of the innocent against "hasty, malicious,
and oppressive persecution." In this respect, the
right to a grand jury proceeding is a basic fifth
amendment guarantee. 23 ' It strains credulity,
however, to suggest that the second function of
the grand jury, that of investigating crimes, is
also protected by the Bill of Rights. The fifth
amendment is normally viewed as a limitation on
the power of the Federal Government, not as a
reinforcement of the prosecutorial powers already
inhering in the executive. 2 While it can hardly
be doubted that a reporter should be compelled
to testify where essential to a defendant's casem
the state interest in the grand jury as an instru-
ment of investigation is not necessarily equally
compelling.
Where the grand jury is investigating the pos-
sible commission of a crime, the press subpoena is
not essential to the due administration of justice.
First, newsmen often comply with the request for
information, even without a subpoena.2 5 Second,
the executive branch usually has other sources of
information and rarely finds it necessary to turn
to the press. 216 Third, surveys of the states which
have enacted newsman privilege statutes indicate
that there is no discernable adverse impact on the
quality of law enforcement.2 Fourth, if forced
testimony severs a newsman's confidential rela-
tionships, denying the privilege will prove self-
defeating and counterproductive.238 In the words
of a noted reporter:239
Once it is established and believed that news cor-
respondents are to be utilized in grand jury investi-
231 Cf. 408 U.S. at 687.
m Donner & Cerruti, supra note 34, passim.
2
11 See text accompanying note 69 supra.
2m Cf. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 50: "If
the name of the source is sought for a criminal trial it
should make a difference whether the party seeking the
name is the prosecutor or the defendant."
23
1Veenker, Chronicling the Cops, THE CmcAGo
GumF, Dec., 1972, at 65, 69; Comment, Government
Investigations, supra note 38, at 1201.
216 Comment, Government Investigations, supra note
38, at 1239 n.217; Desmond, supra note 35, at 8:
[S]urely the law enforcement officials, aided by
staffs of trained technicians and armed with the
latest weapons of science are in a better position to
find a criminal than is a reporter whose only equip-
ment is a "nose for news."
2 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 38.
m Comment, Government Investigations, supra note
38, at 1240: "[A]ny expectation of long range benefits
to the administration of justice stemming from sub-
poenas to the professional press is almost entirely il-
lusory."
239 Walter Cronkite, quoted in Comment, Confiden-
liality of News Sources, supra note 14, at 1083 n.1247.
gation, they will be of precious little value to such
investigations because they will no longer have ac-
cess to information that grand juries might want.
Finally, a policy of forced testimony hinders the
journalist's ability to foster the due administration
of justice via public pressure. The reporter is a
governmental gadfly, uncovering waste and cor-
ruption in public office, and improving the ad-
ministration of justice through the antiseptic
power of exposure.240
In short, the newsman's theory for a constitu-
tional privilege based on an alleged burdening of
the free flow on the news is in large part per-
suasive. The freedom of the press properly extends
to news gathering, compulsory testimony has an
uncertain but important impact on the ability of
reporters to gather the news, the first amendment
requires that the freedoms guaranteed therein
should not be infringed except by compelling state
interests, and the state interest in compelling
journalist's testimony is far from compelling where
the grand jury is performing an investigatory
function. The theory breaks down, however, when
it is suggested that any restriction on the flow of
the news is ipso facto unconstitutional. Since this
premise is essential to the theory, the Supreme
Court properly rejected the newsman's claim in
Branzburg v. Hayes.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY IN SUPPORT
OP A NEWSmaN'S PRVILEGE
Good newspapermen don't want the privi-
lege; bad newspapermen shouldn't get it.
241
As heretofore presented to the courts, the news-
man's privilege would vest in the reporter. Under
the "free flow of information theory" the source
was constitutionally irrelevant,"4 and at com-
mon law, the requested privilege was usually dis-
cretionary with the reporter. 243 This approach
should be modified for two reasons. First, vesting
the privilege in the reportei is contrary to the
concept of a free press embodied in the constitu-
tion. Second, vesting the privilege in the source
240 See, e.g., Desmond, supra note 35, at 9-10:
[11n our complex society, government has become
so vast, so intricate, so remote in its internal ad-
ministration, that our average citizen has neither
the time nor experience to check on his public offi-
cials, and must usually rely on a free press for an
audit of official activities.
24 Example of a less sophisticated argument in the
newsman's privilege debate, cited id. at 7.
2 See note 293 infra.
m See note 283 infra.
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substantially strengthens the newsman's argu-
ments for both a constitutional and a common
law privilege.
Historically, the concept of a free press has
implied an unprivileged press. 44 As Lord Russell
proclaimed in 1900, "The liberty of the press is no
greater and no less than the liberty of every sub-
ject of the Queen." 245 This principle is implicit in
the Supreme Court decisions extending the pro-
tections afforded by the first amendment to those
who distribute handbills in the street2 6 The man
who publishes only a single pamphlet on his
favorite cause should have the same rights as an
established newsman since the freedom of the
press is no more the prerogative of the editor or
publisher than freedom of speech is the exclusive
right of the owner of an assembly hall.24
The FCC has for many years imposed on radio
and television broadcasters the requirement that
discussion of public issues be presented on broad-
cast stations, and that each side of those issues
must be given fair coverage. In upholding the
"fairness doctrine," the Supreme Court in Red
Lion Broadcasting v. FCCm ruled that neither the
government nor the broadcasters themselves could
constitutionally bar non-licensees from access to
the air waves for expression of their views. In
Associated Press v. U-nited States,29 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of antitrust
legislation as applied to the press:
Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not
for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep
others from publishing is not.
As both Red Lio Broadcasting and Associated
Press reveal, the interests of the press as an es-
tablished institution do not always coincide with
the interests of the press as a popular freedom.
It is crucial, therefore, to note that the granting
of a privilege for newsmen, as urged by the pe-
titioners in Branzburg v. Hayes, would strengthen
the established press at the expense of the lone
244 Cf. Semeta, supra note 67, at 311.245 R. v. Gray, 2 Q.B. 36, 40 (1900).
246See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
2 F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL oF THE PRESS 168
(4th ed. 1962); D'Alemberte, supra note 24, at 336; cf.
State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Note, 82 HA~v. L. Rxv.
1384, 1391 (1969).
8 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
249 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
pamphleteer. This conclusion is implicit in the
premise that a testimonial privilege cannot ex-
tend to everyone without rendering the judicial
system impotent.O Since everyone has an equal
right to gather the news,"' if an established jour-
nalist can refuse to reveal the identity of an in-
formant, then every witness called to the stand
might equally refuse to testify on the ground that
the testimonial compulsion violates his first amend-
ment rights.2 2 Thus, it is difficult to deny that
the proposed privilege should extend to researchers,
novelists and other authors who may rely on con-
fidential communications and who contribute to a
vigorous exchange of opinion and information.P
The privilege should also extend to underground
newspapers and student journalistsP In fact,
any attempt to define the limits to such a priv-
ilege breaks down because everyone is arguably
within the defined limits.2 5
An examination of the various state privilege
statutes reinforces the preceding conclusion. Each
of the statutes limits the privilege to the established
media,25 usually by modifying the term "news-
paper" with the phrase "paid general circula-
tion."2S Three dangers inhere in such a classifica-
tion. First, the source who chooses to express him-
self through a publication which does not receive
2
50 Cf. Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources,
supranote14, at 1096 n.1318; text accompanying notes
101-11 supra.
n1 See text accompanying note 249 supra; cf. sources
cited at note 247 supra.
252 Beaver, supra note 3, at 250.
21 House Subcommittee Concludes, supra note 36, at
2082 (quoting Ass't Attorney General Roger C. Cram-
ton):
The pending bills define the category of persons
who would be entitled to claim the privilege largely
in terms that would be applicable to the employees
of large, commercial newsgathering organizations
such as newspapers, broadcast networks, and maga-
zines. While this has the virtue of delimiting the
group entitled to claim the privilege, and thereby
simplifying its administration, we find troublesome
the exclusion of other individuals-such as aca-
demic researchers, novelists, lecturers and drama-
tists-who may rely on confidential sources of in-
formation and who contribute to a vigorous ex-
change of opinion and information.
Cf. Newsman s Privilege Legidation Called Essential,
supra note 35, at 2101 (lobbying activities by the
Author's League).254 Id. at 2102; cf. State v. Lender, 266 Minn. 561,
124 N.W.2d 355 (1963) (no privilege for recent law
school graduate not yet admitted to the bar). But see
Beaver, supra note 3, at 255 (highly unlikely that privi-
lege would extend to student journalists).
255 Beaver, supra note 3, at 258.
258 See D'Alemberte, supra note 24 for a comprehen-
sive and outstanding survey and critique of the various
state newsman's privilege statutes.257Id.
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a paid general circulation is necessarily penalized .2
Second, if the government has the power to allow
a privilege to a special class of news gatherers, it
ipso facto has the power to limit that class. 9 Fi-
nally, if the privilege is essential to newsgathering,
only those with the privilege will be able to effec-
tively gather the news. Accordingly, the news-
man's privilege would "extinguish the traditional
concept that the press and journalists should not
be singled out for special legal favors, ' 26 0 and the
first amendment would become the private pre-
serve of the favored few.
The newsman has attempted to justify the as-
serted privilege by emphasizing that he is not
seeking a narrow, selfish privilege. Rather, he is
seeking to vindicate the larger public right to
know.2 6' This contention confuses the real issue.
Even if the newsman is extolling the public right
to know, he is also asserting the right to serve as
the special representative of the public interest.
The repugnancy of a special privilege is
heightened by the fact that such a privilege would
exacerbate the current trend toward the economic
concentration of the means of publication. One
commentator notes that by the turn of the cen-
tury, the American press became completely trans-
formed and re-created.2 62 The concentration of the
instruments of publication has been an inevitable
concomitant of an astronomical rise in publishing
costs.2 64 In the seven years between 1960 and 1967,
the number of chain-owned daily newspapers
increased by 56 percent; chains currently control
49.3 percent of the dailies in the country
representing 61.8 percent of total circulation; and,
at the present rate of expansion, all daily news-
papers will be owned by chains in less than twenty
258 Note, H~Av. L. Rxv., supra note 247.
259 D'Alemberte, supra note 24, at 320.
260 Semeta, supra note 67, at 313.
2161 Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources, supra
note 14, at 1084 n.1250:
The privilege sought by the news media is not
necessarily for the benefit of the newsman, nor of
the informer, though exercise of the privilege would
have that consequence. The primary purpose of
the privilege is to maintain a steady flow of infor-
marion and though from individuals through the
news media to the public.
But see N.Y. LAW REvisION Cos'N REP. 37 (1949)
(the real desire for the privilege is not a zeal for the pub-
lic good but desire for prestige).
262 Semeta, supra note 67, at 312.
26
3In 1835, when James Gordon Bennett launched the
New York Herald with $500, anybody could start a
newspaper. Today, it would take perhaps S10 million
to establish a major daily. Paneth, Newspapers in
Chains, 214 NATION 588, 589 (1972).
years.2 14 A probable consequence of this concen-
tration of power and money is the control of cen-
ters for the diffusion of ideas, and ultimately, for
opinion manipulation.2 65 As the capacity for or-
ganized control of newspaper opinion by ad-
vertisers is increased, public affairs journalism
becomes bracketed by advertising pressure.
2 6
There are thus serious potential dangers in any
policy which enhances the privileged character of
the established press.
The economic might of the news media is com-
plemented by political power. When the press
speaks with one voice, its "persuasive power upon
politically sensitive legislators is understandably
very strong."2 7 Accordingly, there is little doubt
that media agitation has led to the attractiveness
of "freedom of information" as a political issue.
2 8
Moreover, the press has utilized the machinery
of government to effectuate the changes necessary
to preserve its vital interests.26 9 The power of the
established press extends to the arena of press
subpoenas. Since the reporter who is cited for con-
tempt can count on immense support from news-
papers all over the country, the executive branch
is often deterred from abusing the subpoena power.
The District Attorney in the Newburgh News case,
for example, was vilified in the press and soundly
21
4 Id.; cf. Bishop, The Profits of Fusion, 214 NATIoa
590 (1972).
265 Semeta, supra note 67, at 320.
216 Souter, Chicago Media: Turning On or Tuning
Out?, THE CHICAGO GumE, Dec., 1972, at 57 (quoting
the executive editor of Chicago Today): "[F]rankly,
some [scandals] would be suicide to do considering po-
litical and advertising pressure. It's better to fight an-
other battle at another rime." Cf. White, How Free is
Our Press?, 146 NATION 693-95 (1938):
The advertising agencies undertake to protect their
clients from what the clients and agents may re-
gard as real danger from inimical social, political,
or industrial influences. As advisers the advertising
agencies may exercise unbelievably powerful pres-
sure upon newspapers. There is grave danger that
in the coming decade, as social, industrial, and
economic problems become more and more acute,
this capacity for organized control of newspaper
opinion by the political advisers of national adver-
tisers may constitute a major threat to a free press.
267 Beaver, supra note 3, at 256 n.54.
2 6
8 Blanchard, Present at the Creation: The Media and
the Moss Committee, 49 JouRNAms Q. 271, 274 n.23
(1972); cf. Stone, Review of Pound, Jurisprudence, 75
HAnv. L. REv. 1240, 1248 (1962).269 See D. CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GovERN-
oszr (1959); B. COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POL-
icy (1963); D. Nnsmo, NEWSGATHERmG IN WASHING-
TON (1964); F. SIEBER, T. PETERSON & W. SCHAMU,
FouR THEORIEs OF Tim PREsS (1956); Hachten, The
Press as Reporter and Critic of Government, 40 JOURNAL-
ismi Q. 12 (1963).
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thrashed in the primary in his bid for re-elec-
tion.2 0 More recently, media dramatization of the
plight of various latter-day Zengers precipitated
the Attorney General guidelinesY' In short, there
is considerable justification for Justice Powell's
observation in Branzburg v. Hayes that it is
difficult to seriously believe that "the media-
properly free and untrammeled in the fullest sense
of these terms-[is] not able to protect" itselfY2
Without a special privilege, the established
press has a vested interest in ferreting out abuse of
the grand jury subpoena power. It has been sug-
gested that the grand jury is currently being used
to curb political dissent, to harass and intimidate
the radical left, and to take anti-war intellectuals
to the woodshed.- The problem of press
subpoenas, therefore, is but a "special instance
of a much larger problem which has not yet
received the attention it deserves." 4 The grant-
ing of a special privilege to the media giants would
remove the vital interest the press currently has in
exposing such abuse and thereby precipitating
reform. Consequently, the privilege would protect
only those least in need of protection.
The advocates of a newsman's privilege have
drawn a false dichotomy between first amendment
freedoms and the public interest in the due ad-
ministration of justice. As heretofore presented
to the courts, the privilege is inconsistent with
both the duty to testify and the first amendment
guarantee of an unfavored press. This inconsist-
ency is emphasized throughout the majority opin-
ion in Branzburg v. Hayes.7 5
It is difficult to ascertain why the proponents
of a privilege for journalists have consistently
urged that such a privilege should inure in the
reporter. Since he rarely discloses his source in
any event,16 the reporter should have no serious
objection to vesting the privilege in the source of
confidential communications. 7 Moreover, since
170 People ex rd. Clarke v. Truesdell, 79 N.Y.S.2d 413
(Sup. Ct. 1948). See Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53,
at 48 n.148.
71 Goldstein, supra note 144, at 13.
71 408 U.S. at 709 (concurring opinion).
21 Donner & Cerruti, supra note 34, passim.
17 Goldstein, supra note 144, at 15.
2 5 See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 682.27
6 See note 199 sup ra.
2eBut see Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 45:
"Newsmen need some flexibility to be able to use con-
fidential sources at all." It is difficult to take this argu-
ment seriously. Even the authors note that newsmen
exercising their discretion guard their sources just as
tightly as if they were forbidden by law to disclose. Id.
the courts have not addressed the issue of a priv-
ilege vested in the source,278 such a privilege con-
stitutes an untested avenue for expanding the
protections now afforded to the reporter-source
relationship.
The Source's Privilege as a Common Law Right
In rejecting the newsman's privilege, the com-
mon lav courts have emphasized its anomalous
features. The doctrinal barriers to a common law
privilege can be hurdled, however, by stressing
the rights of the source. The first such barrier is
that the newsman has asserted the right to con-
ceal the identity of his source and nothing more.79
In the usual privilege, protection is provided for
the confidential communications, while the iden-
tity of the source is known.2 0 This barrier can be
overcome by claiming a privilege for the infor-
mation the newsman receives in confidence. In-
deed, newsmen have increasingly attempted to
broaden the perspective of the proposed privilege
to protect more than the identity of the source,28m
and the common law already recognizes the right
to protect the identity of a source when incident
to the proper protection of confidential commun-
ications.m
The second barrier to common law protection
for the reporter-source relationship is that hereto-
fore the privilege has been vested in the newsman
who retains sole discretion as to whether or not the
confidence of his source will be respected.2 In
the typical testimonial privilege, the privilege is
that of the imparter of the confidence, not that of
the recipient.2 14 This barrier is removed from con-
sideration if the privilege is vested in the source of
confidential news.
Finally, the traditional privilege nurtures a
socially desirable relationship. Thus the privilege
278 See notes 283 & 293 infra.279 "[T]he issue in the past has been the duty of the
newsman to reveal the source of his information." Com-
ment, Government Investigations, supra note 38, at 1198.
280 Comment, The Newsman's Privilege and the Con-
stitution, supra ntoe 51, at 447.
281 Cf. id. at 438 n.7.
2 See, e.g., Ex parle McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149
P. 566 (1915).
= See, e.g., Gallup, Further Consideration of a Privi-
lege for Newsmen, 14 ALBANY L. REv. 16, 17 (1950);
Note, CourxiLL L.Q., supra note 67, at 118.
2N The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client;
the physician-patient privilege inures in the patient;
and the priest-penitent privilege is bestowed upon the
reformed sinner. See Note, Privileged Communications-
Some Recent Developments, supra Note 125, at 596, and
cases and materials cited therein.
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for confidential marital communication is sacro-
sanct because of the notion that secrecy will pro-
mote marital harmony;' 5 the doctor-patient priv-
ilege is justified as an incentive to obtain proper
medical care;98 and the attorney-client privilege
is viewed as essential to the frank communica-
tions requisite to an effective defense.'3 The rela-
tionship which would be protected by a newsman's
privilege has been dismissed as fundamentally dif-
ferent from those just described in that it would
engender and foster undesirable alliances with
the criminal underworld.ns The proponents of a
newsman's privilege have not rebutted this char-
acterization of the reporter-source relationship,
and have ignored the rights of the source by em-
phasi7ing the burden on the flow of the news. 9
Were the reporter to stress the desirability of the
relationship per se, therefore, this final doctrinal
barrier to a common law privilege would be over-
come.
290
Admittedly, the common law rule denying pro-
tection to the reporter-source relationship is firmly
entrenched in our judicial system.29' The common
law, however, should not be immune to change.
As was observed in Funk v. United States,2' "the
common law is not immutable but flexible, and
by its own principles adapts itself to varying con-
ditions." Moreover, where the contours of the
privilege are materially altered, precedents deny-
ing the privilege would no longer be controlling.
To perpetuate these precedents would unduly
glorify the dead hand of the common law.
The Source's Privilege as a Constitutional Guar-
antee
In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court
rejected a newsman's privilege which would inure
in the reporter.293 The constitutional question
would be substantially different if the requested
privilege vested in the source. A privilege for the
source would not be inconsistent with the first
28 See Coburn, supra note 120.
268 Coburn, supra note 120, at 607-08.
287 Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1883).
ms Cf. Gallup, supra note 53, at 27.
29 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 27.
29( For a discussion of the desirability of the relation-
ship per se, see text accompanying note 302 infra.
291 Cf. note 127 supra.
29 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933).
23 408 U.S. at 695: "We note first that the privilege
claimed is that of the reporter, not the informant... 2
Cf. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 53, at 45 n.138: "The
purpose of the newsman's privilege is not to protect the
source..., but to promote the flow of the news."
amendment concept of an "unprivileged" press.
Furthermore, the argument for such a privilege
would not depend on the discredited "free flow of
the news theory", but rather on the source's first
amendment right to anonymous speech.
29 4
It has long been urged that the freedoms of
speech and press do not extend to anonymous
speech. Stressing the principle that "[t]he more we
learn, the better," numerous writers have joined
with Chaffee in extolling the desirability of learning
the source of "literary litter.1295 While there is
merit in the Chaffee view, his rejection of con-
stitutional protection for anonymous speech is too
absolute. Under certain circumstances, the first
amendment should and does protect anonymous
publication.
Anonymous speech has played a crucial role
in American history. From the Federalist Papers
of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay to the Letters
of Pacificus by Alexander Hamilton, material
published anonymously helped forge the early
laws of our country.29 Historical practice has
gained increasing judicial sanction. In NAACP
v. Alabanus ex rel. Patterson,2 9' the Supreme Court
ruled that there are times and circumstances when
States may not compel those engaged in the dis-
semination of ideas to be publicly identified. Other
Supreme Court decisions have enunciated the
doctrine that the government may not use in-
direct means such as exposure and public scorn
to achieve results clearly prohibited by the first
amendment." The most important Supreme Court
decision is the case of Talley v. California,"21 where
a statute prohibiting the distribution of anony-
mous handbills was held void on its face on the
grounds that "identification and fear of reprisal
might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public
matters of importance." Whether the Talley rule
protects anonymity in all circumstances was left
an open question, but the logic of the decision
seems to limit the protection to political expres-
sion. 30 This right is particularly important to the
29 See generally Comment, The Constitutional Right
to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70
YALE L.J. 1084 (1961).
295 Chafee, supra note 114, at 490 n.7.
296 Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity,
supra note 294, 15 1085.
2- 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
29 See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 362 U.S. 60 (1960);
Barrenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
299 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).




news source who expresses an unpopular view,
since he is an especially probable object of crit-
icism and reprisal.", To a large degree, the first
amendment protections were forged for the rebel
and the heretic.302
The source, of course, cannot personally assert
his right to anonymous publication and still retain
his anonymity. Accordingly, the newsman should
have standing to assert the rights of his source.
Using the standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr,303 the newsman is a proper
representative party. Since he is injured by com-
pulsory disclosure, the reporter has the adversity
which is the "gist of the question of standing.""3 '
Standing for the newsman can also be premised
on the rationale of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Palterson,0 5 in which the Supreme Court ex-
plained that if the members of the NAACP were
constitutionally entitled to anonymity, the As-
sociation would have standing to assert this right
20L Note, HAav. L. Rav., supra note 247, at 1399.
80 Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity,
supra note 294, at 1109 n.149.
3 369 U.S. 186 (1962).01r _d. at 204.
-05 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
for them. The reasoning of the Court applies with
equal force to the reporter's assertion of the rights
of his source: requiring the source to assert the
right himself "would result in nullification of the
right at the very moment of its assertion."'' r, Some
protection for the reporter-source relationship
was granted in Branzburg v. Hayes, where the
newsmen asserted the public's right to a free flow
of the news. This protection can be supplemented if
reporters assert the source's right to anonymous
speech.
CONCLUSION
Several centuries ago, the journalist had his
ears lopped off for publishing a libel.au7 Today, the
reporter is still being denied his right to hear.
Moreover, the individual who has vital political
information is being denied his right to express
himself anonymously through the medium of the
press. Stressing the first amendment rights of the
source constitutes the most compelling justifica-
tion for judicial expansion of a "novel" privilege.
306 Id. at 459.207 F. THAYER, LEGAL COxTROL OF THa PRESS 9-10
(2d ed. 1950).
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THE RIGHT TO APPEAR PRO SE: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS
In 1942 the United States Supreme Court
rendered two important decisions relating to the
right to counsel in criminal trials. The Court de-
clared in Bets v. Brady1 that the sixth amendment
right to counsel applied only to trials in federal
courts and did not require state courts to supply
lawyers for all indigents who desired an attorney.
Several months later, in Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann,2 the Court appeared to uphold the
right of an accused to reject the assistance of a
lawyer in order to proceed pro se. While the Court's
decision in Adams passed with little notice, Bets v.
Brady had an immediate impact. To some it seemed
that the Supreme Court had retreated from its
earlier pronouncement in Powell v. Alabama3 that
a state court had a duty to assign counsel to those
unrepresented in order to insure a fair hearing.4
Betts seemed a rejection of the Court's reasoning in
Johnson v. Zerbstt which stressed the necessity of
appointing counsel in federal trials on the basis of
"the obvious truth that the average defendant
[does] not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power
to take his life or liberty."
6
1316 U.S. 455 (1942).
2 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
3 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4 Id. at 68-69. Mr. Justice Sutherland's words on
the relationship of the right to counsel to a fair hearing
have long since become famous:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incap-
able, generally, of determining for himself whether
the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid
of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge and convicted upon improper evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise in-
admissable. He lacks both skill and knowledge to
adequately prepare his defense, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every stage in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the
ignorant and illiterate, of those of feeble intellect.
Id. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), the
Supreme Court limited the holding in Powell to its facts
and stated that the defendantbore the burden of proving
that the absence of counsel deprived him of a fair trial.
5 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
6 Id. at 462-63.
Betts remained good law for twenty years, but in
Gideon v. Wainwright' the Supreme Court over-
ruled it, declaring that the sixth amendment right
to counsel was binding on the states as "funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial." s With the
demise of Bets and the triumph of the right to
counsel, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann9
came in for closer scrutiny, a scrutiny given added
urgency by the demands of defendants in pub-
licized trials to appear without legal assistance.
Both courts and commentators explored the thrust
of the right to appear pro se and the tension be-
tween this right and the sixth amendment right to
assistance of counsel. 10 The result was a contro-
versy as to whether there is a constitutional right
to proceed without a lawyer and, if so, the exact
source in the Constitution of that right. This com-
ment will explore the dimensions of the contro-
versy and its ramifications.
Any discussion of this topic must begin with
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann." In Adams
the Supreme Court considered the claim that an
accused could not waive trial by jury unless he
acted upon a lawyer's advice. Writing for the
Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter struck down this
contention as fallacious and then commented on
the right to appear without a lawyer. 2 He viewed
the right to appear pro se as "correlative" to the
right to the assistance of counsel and as resting
upon considerations that went to the substance of
an accused's position before the law. Frankfurter
felt that because the public conscience had to be
satisfied that fairness dominated the admin-
istration of justice, a defendant had to have the
means of presenting his best defense. 3 He stated
7372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 Id. at 342-43.
9317 U.S. 269 (1942).
10 See, e.g., Garcia, Defense Pro Se, 23 U. MIA2I L.
Rv. 551 (1969); Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral
Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MnN. L. REv. 1175
(1970); Riddle, The Right to Defend Pro Se, 3 TExAS
Tacr. L. REv. 89 (1971); Comment, Self-Representa-
tion in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro So
Defendant, 59 CAL. L. Rv. 1479 (1971); Note, The
Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49
Mi-,N. L. R . 1133 (1965); Note, 48 N.C.L. Rv.
678 (1970).
11317 U.S. 269 (1942).
12 Id. at 275.
13 Id. at 279-80.
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that leaving the choice of means to the accused
was an essential aspect of fairness. 4 He depicted
this element of choice as crucial to understanding
the constitutional safeguards of the rights of a
defendant. "To deny an accused a choice of proce-
dure in circumstances in which he, though a lay-
man, is capable... of making an intelligent
choice," was, according to Frankfurter, "to impair
the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by
treating them as empty vebalisms." 15 The Con-
stitution did not force a lawyer upon a defendant.
He might waive his constitutional right to as-
sistance "if he [knew] what he [was] doing and his
choice [was] made with eyes open." 16
While Frankfurter's dictum in Adams remained
the most complete statement on the status of the
right to defend without counsel, the Supreme
Court returned to the question in following years,
always dealing with it tangentially but always
supporting the fundamental nature of the right. In
Carter v. Illinois,17 decided four years after Adams,
the Court considered the right in a case involving
the defendant's claim that he had been improperly
denied the assistance of counsel when pleading
guilty to a charge of murder. Although the Court
declared that the defendant did have a right to
counsel at every stage of his defense, it found that
the accused had waived counsel by not requesting
assistance." The Court went on to assert that the
defendant might make his own defense:
Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor
the vitality it derives from progressive standards
of justice denies a person the right to defend him-
self or confess his guilt.19
Two years later, Mr. Justice Murphy, a dissenter
in Carter, indicated that he agreed with his col-
leagues' classification of the right to defend pro se
as a right of fundamental character. In his opinion
for the Court in Price v. Johnson,2° Justice Murphy
dismissed the claim that a prisoner had the right to
argue his own appeal or be present at appellate
proceedings as different from a defendant's con-
stitutional prerogative to be present at every
significant stage of his felony prosecution or "his
recognized privilege of conducting his own defense
I Id.
"5 Id. at 280.
16 Id.
17 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
is Id. at 177.
19 Id at 174.
20 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
at trial. "2 In Moore v. Michigan," the Court held
that the defendant had a constitutional right to
counsel at the time of his guilty plea, but stressed
that the right did "not justify forcing counsel upon
an accused who wants none. "2
The Supreme Court's few and sometimes cryptic
comments concerning the right to appear pro se
have left comprehensive discussion of the subject
to the lower courts, both state and federal. It is
here that the parameters of the dispute have been
articulated. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit presented the strongest
argument in favor of the constitutional stature of
the right to dispense with a lawyer's assistance in
United States v. Plaitner."2 In that case, the peti-
tioner had been assigned a lawyer for a coram iwbis
hearing despite his insistent requests that he be
allowed to represent himself. The court held that
the district court had erred in denying the peti-
tioner's request. It reversed the lower court's
dismissal of Plattner's petition and remanded the
case for rehearing. The Second Circuit declared
that the appellant did not have to show prejudice
from the district court's refusal to allow him to
plead his own case because the right to act pro se
in a criminal trial was "a right arising out of the
Federal Constitution and not the mere product of
legislation or judicial decision. "2-
While the Second Circuit relied heavily upon
Frankfurter's argument in Adams, it also ex-
panded upon it. According to the court of appeals,
both the due process clause of the fifth amendment
and the assistance of counsel provision of the
sixth amendment imply the right of an accused to
manage and conduct his own defense in a criminal
case. 26 The court asserted that the right to counsel,
while included in the Constitution "to buttress
and supplement all the other rights of a defendant
charged with crime," was "surely not intended to
limit in any way the absolute and primary right to
conduct one's own defense in propia personna. "2
The court pointed to section 35 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 as proof of its contention. Signed into
law by President George Washington one day
before the sixth amendment was proposed in Con-
gress, section 35 declared that in all federal courts
211d. at 285.
355 U.S. 155 (1957).
"Id. at 161.
24330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
"Id. at 273.




the parties were entitled to "plead and manage
their own cases personally" or with the assistance
of counsel." By such language, the court in Plat-
tner contended, section 35 gave meaning to the
"terse" language of the sixth amendment and
indicated that the constitutional right to the as-
sistance of counsel was intended to include the
right to defend pro se.29 The court directed at-
tention to rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which stipulates that a defendant has
the right to refuse counsel.30 Also, it noted that
the constitutions of thirty-seven states guaranteed
that right."1
While many jurisdictions accept the premise
that the right of self-representation is one of con-
stitutional dimension, none view it as an absolute
privilege." Virtually all courts and commentators
agree that in order to exercise the right a defendant
must be suijuris and, in keeping with the language
28id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) which is the mod-
ern equivalent of section 35 and uses essentially the
same language.
2"330 F.2d at 274.
'Old. at 275. FED. R. Cams. P. 44:
If the defendant appears in court without counsel,
the court shall advise him of his right to counsel
and assign counsel to represent him at every stage
of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed with-
out counsel or is able to obtain counsel.
31330 F.2d at 274. At present, six state constitutions
guarantee the accused in a criminal prosecution the
right to be heard either by himself, counsel or both:
ALA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6; FLA. CONsT. DEC. OF RiGnTs,
§ 11; ME. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6; Miss. CoNsT. art. 3, § 26;
Tax. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
Twenty-six state constitutions protect the right of a
criminal defendant to be heard in person and by counsel:
Aiz. CONST. art. 2, § 24; Aax. CONST. art. 2, § 10;
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 16; CoNN. CoiqST. art. 1, § 9;
DaL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; IDaO CONST. art. 1, § 13;
ILL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8; IND. CONsT. art. 1, § 13; Ky.
CONST. BiLL OF RIGHTS, § 11; MO. CONST. art. 1,
§ 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. 3, § 16; NEV. CONST. art. 1,
§ 18; N.H. CONST. BILL Or RiGnTS, art. 15; N.M.
CONST. art. 2, § 23; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; N.D.
CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHIo CONST. art. 1, § 10; OKLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 20; ORE. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11; PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 8; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 7; TENN.
CONST. art. 1, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. 1 § 10; VT. CONST.
chap. 1, art. 10; Wis. CoNST. art. 1, § 7; WNo. CoNsT.
art 1, § 10. See also LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
Four states provide for the right to appear and
defend in person or by counsel: KAN. CONST. BiLL OF
RIoirrs, § 10; MAss. CONST. part 1, art. 12; NEB.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 11; WAsH. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
2For courts accepting the right, see Haslam v.
United States, 431 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971); United States v. Warner,
428 F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930
(1970); Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100, 103 (7th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165,
1169-70 (6th Cir. 1969); Juelich v. United States, 342
F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Johnson,
333 F.2d 1004, 1005 (6th Cir. 1964).
of Johnson v. Zerbst," must waive the right to
counsel intelligently and competently. 4 Although
there is considerable debate over exactly what con-
stitutes an "intelligent and competent" waiver, 35
most federal courts that have dealt with the sub-
ject have stipulated that the crucial factor is
whether the defendant fully understands the con-
sequences of his decision.'" Most agree that there
can be no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes
a valid waiver. Rather its validity must depend
upon the circumstances of the particular case and a
defendant should not arbitrarily be prevented
from exercising his right to represent himself.U
The courts look much less charitably upon a
represented defendant's right to waive counsel
once the trial has begun. Even the Second Circuit,
which authored the Plattner decision, declared that
while the right of a criminal defendant to act as
his own lawyer was "unqualified" if invoked prior
to the start of trial, once the trial had begun with
representation, his right to waive counsel was
sharply curtailed." The court asserted that a denial
of a defendant's mid-trial demand to dismiss his
lawyer was reversible error only if the defendant
-304 U.S. 458 (1938).
14Id. at 456.
15 For an example of a jurisdiction where the judges
disagreed as to what constituted a waiver see United
States ex ret. Minor v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623 (8th Cir.
1970); United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970). See also Note,
The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49
Mnw. L. REv. 1133 (1965) for a discussion of what
factors should be considered in determining the validity
of a waiver.
"6 In Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1043
(9th Cir. 1969), the court of appeals concisely expressed
the standard to be followed:
The question before the judge was not whether the
defendant was professionally capable of acting as
his own lawyer. Few defendants are, and the right
of representation is not so conditioned. The ques-
tion was simply whether the defendant understood
the charges against him and was fully aware of the
fact that he would be on his own in a complex area
where experience and professional training are
greatly to be desired.
See also United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970); Lowe v. United
States, 418 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1969); Arnold v. United
States, 414 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Johnson, 333 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1964).
"IThis is in keeping with Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938), which mandated that the deter-
mination of whether or not there had been an intelligent
waiver of counsel must depend in each instance "upon
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused."
s United States ex. rel. Maldanado v. Denno, 348
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007
(1966).
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could demonstrate that the prejudice to his in-
terests occasioned by such a denial overbalanced
"the potential disruption of proceedings already
in progress. " 11 Most courts use this "potential
disruption" test, some adding variations of their
own.4O
The acceptance of the constitutional basis of the
right to appear pro se has not been unanimous. 4'
In People v. Sharp" the California supreme court
not only provided the most recent attack on the
theory that the United States Constitution pro-
tected the right of one criminally charged to plead
his own cause without the aid of counsel,4' but it
also gave judicial sanction to an amendment to the
state constitution which took away the right to
proceed pro se in a criminal prosecution."
Jerome Sharp was charged with grand theft.
After the defendant and his court-appointed lawyer
waived trial by jury, the court found Sharp guilty
and sentenced him to prison. On appeal, Sharp
claimed that the trial court had erred prejudicially
in refusing to permit him to represent himself at
trial. The California supreme court disagreed.
Looking to England in pre-colonial time and to
39 Id. at 15.
0See, e.g., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th
Cir. 1972); Sanchez v. United States, 311 F.2d 327
(9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963). For
a good discussion of some of these variations see Grano,
The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due
Process, 54 MaN. L. Ray. 1175, 1181-84 (1970).
4For examples of decisions rejecting the consti-
tutional basis of the right see Van Nattan v. United
States, 357 F.2d 161, 1653-64 (10th Cir. 1966); Butler v.
United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir. 1963);
Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 249, 258 (D.C. Cir.
1959).
7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1380 (1973).
4 For earlier attacks see the cases cited in note 41
supra.
4CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13. Section 13 was amended
by the adoption of Proposition 3 at the California
primary election of June 6, 1972 to take effect on June
7, 1972. The amendment was proposed by Senate
Constitutional Amendment No. 42, 1971 Regular Ses-
sion. As amended, section 13 now provides in pertinent
part:
In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever,
the party accused shall have the right to a speedy
and a public trial and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense; to have the process of the
court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf, -andt4o appear-and -defend in persoa and to
be personally present with counsel.... The Legisla-
ture shall have power to require the defendant in a
felony case to hare the assistance oJ counsel....
[Provisions deleted from section 13 as it appeared at
the time of Sharp and prior to the amendment are
printed in Stiikeeut type; inserted or added provisions
are italicized.] See 7 Cal. 3d at 464,499 P.2d at 498-99,
103 Cal. Rptr. at 242-43.
American colonial declarations of rights, the court
did not find any concrete evidence as to the funda-
mental nature of the right of self-representation in
criminal trials.4 5 Examining the sixth amendment
itself, the court discerned nothing in the express
language of the Constitution to support the con-
tention that an accused had a constitutional right
to defend without counsel.
46
While it tended to dismiss Justice Frankfurter's
language in Adams as dictum, the California
supreme court agreed that the right to counsel,
like other constitutional rights, could be waived. 0
Nevertheless, the court averred that the ability to
waive a constitutional protection was not itself
necessarily a right of constitutional proportions."s
The court believed that the situation in Sharp
was analogous to that in Singer v. United States,49
a case in which the defendant questioned the con-
stitutionality of rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 23(a) stipulated that a
jury trial could be waived by a defendant only
with the approval of both the presiding judge and
the prosecutor.' 0 The defendant in Singer claimed
that because the right to waive a jury was a cor-
ollary to the constitutional right to a jury trial, it
could not be conditioned on anyone's approval.
The United States Supreme Court rejected this
position. In an opinion written by Chief Justice
Warren, the Court argued that the ability to waive
a constitutional right did not ordinarily carry with
it the opposite of that right.5' Warren emphasized
that the Constitution established trial by jury as
the "normal" and "preferable" mode of dispensing
with issues of fact in criminal cases.5
2
A defendant's only constitutional right concerning
the method of trial i's to an impartial trial by jury.
We find no constitutional impediment to condition-
ing the waiver on the consent of the prosecuting
attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses
to consent, the result is simply that the defendant
is subject to an impartial trial by jury-the very
thing that the constitution guarantees him."
Is 7 Cal. 3d at 454, 499 P.2d at 492, 103 Cal. Rptr.
at 236.
46 Id. at 455, 499 P.2d at 493, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
47 1d.
48 Id.
4 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
15 Fpm. R. Cmm. P. 23(a):
Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so
tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in
writing with the approval of the court and the
consent of the government.
"1380 U.S. at 34-35.
52 Id. at 35.
5Id. at 36.
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The court in Sharp picked up Chief Justice
Warren's language in Singer and, while admitting
that it did not address itself to the right to counsel,
concluded that there was no good reason why the
waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel was
a constitutional right when waiver of the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury was not.N In
both, a refusal for good cause to allow the waiver
only rendered the accused that which the Con-
stitution expressly guaranteed him .
55
The California supreme court's reliance upon
Singer v. United States is not well founded. The
United States Constitution treats the right to
counsel quite differently from the right to trial by
jury. 6 In addition to the sixth amendment guar-
antee of a speedy trial by an impartial jury, article
III, section 2 requires that the trial of all crimes,
except impeachment, shall be by jury.U No similar
directory language is used with regard to counsel.
The sixth amendment guarantees only the as-
sistance of counsel. The majority in Singer ap-
parently recognized the difference between the two
rights. Although they mentioned waiver of counsel
as one of those constitutional rights "subjected to
reasonable procedural regulations," the Court did
not include it with trial by jury as one of those
rights which does not ordinarily carry with it the
right to insist on the opposite of the right.53 This
failure to include the right to counsel takes on
added significance in view of the Court's words in
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann59 to the
effect that no court can force a lawyer upon a
defendant. 0
The difference between the right to a jury trial
and the right to counsel is also manifested in the
history of the two guarantees. In Singer, the Su-
preme Court traced the history of the right to trial
by jury from its early English beginnings as an
alternative to trial by battle, ordeal or compur-
4 7 Cal. 3d at 455, 499 P.2d at 493, 103 Cal. Rptr.
at 237.
56 The following discussion of the difference in treat-
ment afforded by the United States Constitution to
the right to trial by jury and the right to assistance of
counsel relies on the excellent discussion in Comment,
Self-Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of
the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CAL. L. REv. 1479, 1488-89
(1971).
'7 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
M The Court did include the right to a public trial,
the right to be tried in the state and district where the
crime was committed, and the right to be confronted
by witnesses as rights that do not ordinarily carry with
them their opposite. 380 U.S. at 35.
59 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
60 Id. at 279.
gation, through the American colonial experience,
to the drafting of the federal Constitution.' The
Court concluded that at the time of the consti-
tutional convention there was little if any recog-
nition of a defendant's right to trial by a court
sitting without a jury and that consequently this
option was not intended to be an integral part of
the right to jury trial guaranteed by article EU or
the sixth amendment. 2
In Sharp, the California court pursued a similar
historical analysis in reference to the right of self-
representation and arrived at a similar conclu-
sion-that such a right was not recognized prior
to the drafting of the Constitution and thus was
not intended by the founding fathers to be a right
implied by the sixth amendment or any other
provision of the Constitution.6 This conclusion
rests upon a faulty reading of history. The Cal-
ifornia supreme court was correct in asserting that
in both England and colonial America self-repre-
sentation probably was commonplace," but the
court was wrong in concluding that the concept of
a fundamental right of self-representation was but
a "vague" notion at the time of the signing of the
Constitution. 65 On the contrary, although the right
was rarely articulated as such, it was widely ac-
"1380 U.S. at 27-34.
62Id. at 31.
657 Cal. 3d at 353-54, 499 P.2d at 492, 103 Cal.
Rptr. at 236.
"In England, the early identification of the Crown's
interests with those of the prosecution in criminal trials
limited the defendant's right to the aid of counsel.
While those accused of misdemeanors could retain
counsel from a very early period and those charged with
treason were granted the right in the middle of the
Eighteenth Century, felony defendants were not ac-
corded the right to counsel until 1836. Prior to that
year, however, many English judges allowed counsel
to argue points of law, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses and do everything for the accused except
address the jury. 5 W. HoLswoRTH, A HsTORy or
ENGLISH LAW 192 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Hors-
woRTH]; 6 HoL SWoRrx 234 (1924); 9 HoLDsWORT11
235 (1926); 11 HornsWoRm 550-51 (1926). See also
J. GRANT, OUR COMMON LAW CONSITTION 5-10
(1960).
In the American colonies, the right to counsel was
less circumscribed than in England, but the limited
supply of lawyers left most defendants to defend them-
selves. W. BEAI-EY, THE RIGHT To CotmsEL ix AMER[-
cA, COURTs 25 (1955). See T. NAUGHITON & J. GOEBEL,
JR., LAW EN:FORcEmENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 573-
74 (1944); H. RANKIN, CRImINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN TuE GENERAL COURT oF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 67-
123 (1965); A. ScoTT, CRIMuNAL LAW IN COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 77-79 (1930); C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF
THE AmERicAN BAR 3-18 (1911).
65 7 Cal. 3d at 454, 499 P.2d at 492, 103 Cal. Rptr.
at 236.
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knowledged and cherished as a fundamental
right.
The Puritans who settled in Massachusetts
Bay brought with them a hatred of lawyers that
was exceeded only by their love and fear of God.Y
In the first official compilation of the laws of the
colony they forbade attorneys from taking fees
for their labors and in a later statute forbade
lawyers from sitting in the legislature. 9 This
antipathy was reflected in virtually all of the
colonies, often finding expression in legislation.
As early as 1677, the Concessions and Agreements
of West New Jersey provided "that no person shall
be compelled to fee any attorney or councillor to
plead his cause, but that all persons have free
liberty to plead his own cause, if he pleases." 7
Five years later, the Pennsylvania Frame of
Government (1682) included the provision that "in
all courts all persons of all persuasions may freely
appear in their own way, and according to their
own manner, and there personally plead their cause
themselves; or, if unable, by their friends .... "71
In the flurry of state constitution-making which
followed the Declaration of Independence, the
right of self-representation was not forgotten.
Article IX of the Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights (1776) guaranteed that "in all prosecutions
66 The assumption of the California supreme court
seems to be that because the right to appear pro se was
not often articulated, it was not widely acknowledged.
It should be pointed out that some rights, e.g., the
right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," are
considered so basic that they do not have to be articu-
lated and seldom are.
7 C. WARREN, A HISToRY oF Tm AmEm~cAN BAR
7 (1911). These refugees believed that they had suffered
under the existing system of justice in England and
blamed the lawyers, as agents of that system, for much
of their distress. In addition, many of them probably
looked upon lawyers in England as virtually synony-
mous with the "cringing" attorneys of the Crown and
the arbitrary justices of the King's courts who seemed
bent upon the perversion of justice and the conviction
of all who opposed the Stuart prerogative.
" Section 26 of Nathaniel Ward's Body of Liberties
(1641), the first official compilation of the laws of
Massachusetts, stipulated:
[E]very man who findeth himself unfit to plead his
own cause in any Court shall have Libertie to em-
ploy any man against whom the Court doth not
except, to help him Provided he give noe fee or
reward for his paines.
COLONIAL LAws OF MlAsSAcHUSETTS 39 (W. Whitmore
ed. 1889).
69 4 REcoams oF Tk GOVERoR ANTD CoPANY oF
MSsAc~rnsrrs BAY IN Nw EGLA D 87 (N. Shurt-
leff ed. 1853-54).
70 1 B. ScnwATz, THE BIL. oF RIGHTS: A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY 129 (1971).
71 Id. at 140.
for criminal offenses, a man hath a right to be
heard by himself and his counsel. "72 The con-
stitutions of Vermont (1777) 71 and New Hampshire
(1783)74 had similar provisions, while the citizens
of Massachusetts adopted a slightly altered ver-
sion 75 The Georgia Constitution of 1777, in at-
tempting to control the unauthorized practice of
law, stressed that its strict provisions against un-
licensed practitioners were "not intended to ex-
clude any person from the inherent privilege of
every freeman, the liberty to plead his own
cause." 11
While the paucity of information makes it diffi-
cult to determine the exact status of the right to
proceed pro se in the constitutional schema of the
new states, available data supports the conclusion
that it was a highly valued right. In a pamphlet
defending the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776,
which he had helped draft, Thomas Paine con-
sidered the status of the right of self-representa-
tion:
Either party... has a natural right to plead his
own cause; this right is consistent with safety,
therefore it is retained; but the parties may not
be able, nay, they may be dumb, therefore the civil
right of pleading by proxy, that is, by a counsel,
is an appendage of the natural right .... 7
A decade after Paine penned these words,
farmers and revolutionary war veterans of the
western counties of Massachusetts took up arms
against what they considered an oppressive state
government. Among the demands most frequently
pressed by these dissidents were abolition of the
legal profession and representation of their own
interests in court.70 While this insurrection, known
as Shays' Rebellion, provided impetus to the call
72 Id. at 265.
73Id. at 323.
74 Id. at 377.7 Id. at 342. The Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights declared that "every subject" had the right "to
be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his counsel,
at his election."
76 Id. at 300.
7Id. at 315-16.
71 See Instructions of the Town of East Sudbury to
its Representative, Joseph Curtis, Esq., on file in
Massachusetts Archives, MA:A:Doc., 2305; Instruc-
tions of the Town of Acton, June 12, 1786, in Shays'
Rebellion MSS, on file with American Antiquarian
Society, Worcester, Mass.; Instructions of the Town
of Stoughton to its Representative, James Endicott,
May 17, 1786, quoted in D. HuNToON, HISTORY OF TH
TowN OF CANTON 428 (1893). For the role of anti-
lawyer feeling in Shays' Rebellion see Gawalt, Sources
of Anti-Lavw)er Sentiment in Massachusetts, 1740-1840,
14 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 283 (1970); Smith, Features of
Shays' Rebellion, 8 Wm. & MARY QUART. 77 (1948).
1973]
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for a constitutional convention, 9 most of its ad-
herents opposed the ratification of the Constitution
without a Bill of Rights, including the right to as-
sistance of counsel. In requiring recognition of this
right, however, it is doubtful that these insur-
rectionists or their countrymen would have ac-
knowledged any diminishment of the fundamental
character of the right to appear pro se.
To say that Eighteenth Century Americans re-
garded the right of one accused to appear pro se
as a right of fundamental stature is not to say that
this privilege is automatically guaranteed by the
Constitution. The inference that it is so guaranteed
may be a sound one, but it must be supported by
words in the Constitution itself. Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann" found the requisite support in the sixth
amendment, the only part of the Constitution
which mentions counsel. Yet the sixth amendment
right refers only to the "assistance of counsel."
While Frankfurter extrapolated from these words
the corollary that the right to assistance of counsel
included the right to reject such assistance,"' this
seems a heav load to drape on the bare bones of
the sixth amendment alone, especially in view of
the antagonistic relationship of the two rights.Y
Even discounting the Supreme Court's argument
in Singer v. United States that the mere guarantee
of a right does not ordinarily carry with it a guar-
antee of the opposite of that right, 3 it appears that
the Court's rationale in the right to counsel cases-
Powell v. Alabama," Johnson v. Zerbst"s and Gideon
v. Wainwright6"-makes this antagonistic relation-
ship crucial. If this rationale is correct in its salient
thrust that the right to counsel is one of the safe-
guards "necessary to insure the fundamental
human rights of life and liberty "87 and is "funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial, "" it is difficult
to conceive how the right to reject counsel could,
by virtue of its opposite relationship alone, be a
constitutional right emanating from the same
source.
Although the sixth amendment right to counsel
72 R. TAYLOR, WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE
REVOLUTION 168 (1954).
80 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
8" Id. at 279. See text accompanying notes 12-16
su ra.
B2The discussion that follows was outlined to some
extent in Note, 48 N.C.L. REv. 678, 682 (1970).
83380 U.S. 24 (1965).
84 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
85 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
86 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
87304 U.S. at 462.
'8372 U.S. at 342.
is essential for due process and the right to proceed
pro se is neither correlative to that right nor ex-
pressly mentioned in the Constitution, the right
to defend pro se is, nevertheless, a constitutional
mandate. Due process in its procedural sense is
not confined to the contours expressly outlined in
the Constitution. 9 The Supreme Court, on oc-
casion, has gone beyond the Constitution's ex-
tensive list of due process limitations to draw from
non-constitutional sources. While early cases
identified those sources as the "settled usages and
modes of proceeding transplanted from England
to America, " 90 in recent years the Court has em-
ployed the "fair trial" test to invalidate, on due
process grounds, procedure in criminal cases which
is not specifically forbidden by constitutional
provisions.91
In applying the "fair trial" test, the Court, in
effect, measures the procedure against the require-
ment that it not detract from the viability of the
judicial process, a viability dependent upon the
community's belief that the system will resolve
disputes as quickly and as justly as possible. In
criminal cases, such viability is directly related to
the public's faith that the government, which en-
joys such an obvious power advantage over an ac-
cused, will act in a responsible manner and that
the defendant will have the opportunity to present
his best defense."
The right to appear pro se bears directly upon
this last point-the defendant's opportunity to
"0 For an excellent discussion of the due process
clause in general and the non-constitutional sources of
due process limitations in particular, see Ratner, The
Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
1048 (1968).
"De ex dem Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improve-
ment Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). See Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
91 On such grounds the Court proscribed the knowing
use of false evidence by the prosecution in Miller v.
Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); non-disclosure by the prosecu-
tion of probative exculpatory evidence in Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); "non-rational" presump-
tions tending to shift the burden of proof to the de-
fendant in United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136
(1965); and trial by a predisposed judge in In re Murchi-
son, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). See Ratner, The Function of
the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048 (1968).
92Many of the safeguards of the Bill of Rights are
directed toward permitting the defendant to present
his best defense. The sixth amendment, for example,
allows the accused sufficient notice to prepare his
defense ("the accused shall be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation"), and opportunity to
discover and present relevant evidence ("the accused
shall enjoy the right to... have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor") and to test adverse
evidence ("the accused shall enjoy the right to... be
confronted by the witnesses against him").
[Vol. 64
RIGHT TO APPEAR PRO SE
present his best defense. Some commentators argue
that in view of the potential complexity of even
minor criminal prosecutions, a defendant can-
not possibly present his best defense without
the assistance of counsel. Therefore, due process
holds that it is absurd for an accused to proceed
without counsel; a defendant through ignorance,
vanity or stupidity should not be allowed to cut
his own throat.93 One commentator suggests
that such a result only serves to discredit the
judicial system in the eyes of the community.9 He
insists that even if a due process right to appear
pro se existed at some time in the distant past,
changes in criminal procedure have rendered it an
obsolete and dangerous relic.95
These contentions miss the point. As the Second
Circuit argued in United States ex rel. Maldanado
v. Denno," a defendant cannot present his best
defense if he is forced to accept the services of a
lawyer who does not enjoy his confidence. Dis-
trust of lawyers, so manifest in colonial times, is
far from moribund today, especially among mem-
bers of minority groups and those with unpopular
political beliefs.Y When unwilling defendants are
represented by counsel the result often is turmoil,
conflict, and injury to the public esteem of the
courts. Furthermore, pro se defendants are not as
helpless as critics contend. Although not required
to do so, trial courts often aid the defendant in the
presentation of his case by advising him as to
procedure, relaxing the rules of evidence, and pro-
tecting his rights by objecting to improper actions
by the prosecutor.9' Frequently this latter practice
is unnecessary because prosecutors, strenously at-
tempting to avoid error and arouse the sympathy
of the jury for the accused, take great pains to pro-
tect the rights of the pro se defendant. 99
Despite the efforts of the judge and the prose-
" See, e.g., Garcia, Defense Pro Se, 23 U. Mr.N L.
Rxv. 551, 557 (1969); Grano, The Right to Counsel:
Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 Mnnm. L.
Rxv. 1175, 1198-1207 (1970).
04 Grano, supra note 93, at 1194-98.
93Id. at 1192.
95 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1007 (1966).
97 See text accompanying note 110 infra. For a dis-
cussion of the motivation behind requests to proceed
pro se, see Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal
Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CAr..
L. Rzv. 1479, 1499 (1971).
9 See text accompanying notes 119-21 infra. In
Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949), the Supreme
Court recognized that a trial judge "may guide a de-
fendant without a lawyer past the errors that make
trials unfair .....
"See text accompanying note 122 infra.
cutor, most defendants who waive counsel lose at
trial.-' 0 Many probably would have been acquitted
if they had retained an attorney. However, this is
insufficient justification for forcing a lawyer on
every defendant. Due process is involved only
marginally with who wins or who loses; its primary
focus is on how the accused was brought to trial
and how his case was tried. The judicial system's
credibility depends upon this. Crucial to this
credibility is the defendant's own determination
of his defense, i.e., his trial strategy, his theory of
defense, his decision whether or not to take the
witness stand. The choice should be left to him
because he has the most to lose if the choice is
wrong and the community-at-large must not be al-
lowed to believe that the fate of an accused was
sealed before trial began due to government
dictation as to methods of defense.' The same due
process considerations that allow a defendant to
choose his defense also require that he be allowed
the choice of representing himself. Without this
right of choice, the defendant becomes a mere
spectator at his trial, his destiny to be decided by
a system over which others exercise complete con-
trol.
Such a system hardly comports with the respect
for individual worth and autonomy which theoreti-
cally is one of the most cherished ideals of our so-
ciety. Eighteenth Century Americans expressed
this respect when they included the right to appear
pro se in their state constitutions.'9 ' If the right is
outdated, then so is the ideal which supported it.
Conversely, if respect for human autonomy is still
valued in this society, the right of self-representa-
tion in criminal trials must be as fundamental a
right as ever, necessary in the eyes of society for a
fair trial and thus an essential requirement of due
process.
APPENDIX
Because the United States Supreme Court has
not as yet made any definitive statement on the
00 See text accompanying note 124 infra.
101 This was the thrust of part of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's argument in Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). See text accompanying
notes 12-16 supra.
12 This respect was the cornerstone of United States
ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 1007 (1966), where the
court asserted that:
[Elven in cases where the accused is harming him-
self by insisting on conducting his own defense,
respect for individual autonomy requires that he
be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if he




constitutional basis of the right to appear pro se,
practice regarding a criminal defendant's exercise
of this option varies from jurisdiction to juris-
diction and even from trial court to trial court.
In order to obtain some idea of the status of the
privilege at the trial court level in at least one
jurisdiction, the author conducted a survey of the
trial judges of Illinois. 1°o Of the 590 questionnaires
sent out, ninety-nine were returned either partially
or wholly completed. 4 These responses give a
fairly consistent, albeit impressionistic, picture of
the position of the pro se defendant in Illinois.
According to the judges surveyed, relatively few
criminal defendants wish to proceed without
counsel.1 0 5 Only one judge put the number of
felony defendants requesting the right at over five
per cent'06 and while some judges estimated that
over seventy-five per cent of those charged with
misdemeanors opted for self-defense, the majority
set the figure at somewhere below ten per cent.107
These figures are mere approximations, but they
would seem to indicate that courts are not being
deluged with defendants demanding the right to
represent themselves.
Perhaps because of the "political" trials of recent
103 The circuit court is the trial court in Illinois and
is manned by circuit judges and associate judges. The
circuit judges are elected for a term of six years. Asso-
ciate judges are appointed for four year terms by the
circuit judges in accordance with Illinois Supreme
Court Rules. The state is divided into twenty-one
judicial circuits, each with a Chief Judge elected by his
fellow circuit judges. The Chief Judge has general ad-
ministrative authority in his circuit. He divides the
work load among the circuit and associate judges with
a degree of specialization germane to the particular
circuit. The Chicago circuit is more specialized than
other circuits. While circuit judges may hear any type
of case assigned to them by the Chief Judge, associate
judges may not try criminal cases in which the de-
fendant is charged with an offense punishable by im-
prisonment for more than one year.
104 The questionnaire is on file in the editorial offices
of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.
105 Some commentators leave the impression that
there is an increasing trend for defendants to represent
themselves. See, e.g., Laub, The Problem of the Unrepre-
sented, Misrepresented and Rebellious Defendant in
Criminal Court, 2 DuQursNr L. REv. 245 (1964).
106 Eleven judges stated that no felony defendants
desired to proceed without counsel.
101 Only two judges put the figure at over seventy-five
per cent, while forty-six estimated that less than ten
per cent of those charged with misdemeanors wished to
defend themselves. See Note, The Representation of
Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District
Courts, 76 HALv. L. Rv. 579, 584 (1963), where the
results of a survey of federal district judges demon-
strated that in about one-half the districts surveyed
less than twenty per cent of the defendants waived the
right to counsel, but in a few districts more than eighty
per cent did.
years and the demands for pro se defense that often
accompanied them, some commentators have sug-
gested that requests for the right of self-repre-
sentation stem from a desire to cause such an
uproarious situation that reversible error is un-
avoidable.108 Based on this survey, it appears that
political motives play a minor role in pro se re-
quests. While one judge did claim that pro se
defendants wanted "to be part of the Chicago 7"
and several of his colleagues listed the hope of
disruption and error as the motive behind demands
for self-representation, 09 most judges agreed that
such requests stemmed from more innocent con-
siderations. Primary among these considerations
was the defendant's faith in his own innocence, a
factor cited by more judges than any other.1' 0
Close behind, however, were the defendants' mis-
trust of lawyers and the defendants' general ig-
norance."' Several judges made the point that
many defendants who did not qualify for appointed
counsel eschewed professional legal assistance
rather than pay a lawyer." 2 Other judges believed
that the defendant's decision to defend pro se was
an expression of his egotism or, as one judge put it,
the result of the defendant's "belief in his superior
intellect [and the] general stupidity of the court
and attorneys generally. " n3
Although the constitution of Illinois grants the
right to defend "in person and by counsel ""1 and
the state's highest court has interpreted this
language as a guarantee of the right to appear pro
se,' 5 in practice the right is very limited. Most of
those judges surveyed condition permission to
proceed without counsel on the seriousness of the
108 See, e.g., Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented,
Misrepresented, and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal
Court, 2 DUQUESNE L. Rxv. 245 (1964); Riddle, The
Right to Defend Pro Se, 3 T xAs TEC. L. Rav 89
(1971).
1"Two judges listed the hope of disruption and
error as the prime motivating factors behind requests
for the right of self-representation. Another judge pos-
tulated that political motivation was the chief reason
for such requests.
110 Twenty-three judges indicated that they believed
that defendants desired to proceed without a lawyer be-
cause the accused believed strongly in his own inno-
cence.
I' Seventeen judges answered mistrust of lawyers as
the primary motivation behind requests to defend pro
se, while twelve estimated that such demands were
attributable to the defendants' ignorance.
m Seven judges gave this explanation top priority.
"' Five judges offered this analysis.
1 ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
15 See People v. Robinson, 27 Ill. 2d 289, 179 N.E.2d
637 (1963).
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alleged offense."' Some said that they insisted on
representation by counsel in all felony cases, some
drew the line at crimes punishable with imprison-
ment, and some required representation in all
trials involving juries.n '
Of the few defendants who are allowed to waive
counsel, most plead guilty, leaving only a few,
usually charged with misdemeanors, who actually
go to trial alone."8 They often are accorded special
treatment. Although some judges stated that they
did not conduct a trial involving a pro se defendant
any differently than one in which the accused was
represented by a lawyer, n a most acknowledged
that they modified procedure. Most judges stressed
that they made a point of informing the defendant
of his rights and the proper procedure to be fol-
lowed at all stages of the trial."0 Many asserted
that they allowed greater latitude in the examina-
tion of witnesses and the admission of evidence
although only one indicated that he would go so
far as to throw the rules of evidence "out the
window."' " Several judges actively assisted the
accused, including questioning witnesses and
raising objections.
In response to the question of whether the
prosecutor deals with a pro se trial in a different
116 When asked why they denied requests to proceed
pro se, eighteen judges replied that their most im-
portant consideration was the seriousness of the offense
charged. Eight said it was the defendant's ignorance of
the law, six stated that it was the defendant's general
ignorance, and two said it was the complexity of the
particular case. Several judges said that they allowed
any mentally competent defendant to represent himself
if he intelligently waived assistance of counsel.
" Eleven judges replied that they refused to allow
any defendants charged with felonies to waive counsel.
Two said that they refused if a jury trial was involved
and four denied the right if a jail sentence was possible.
Eleven respondents permitted pro se defenses only if the
defendant accepted the appointment of advisory
counsel.
118 Forty-four of the sixty-three judges who answered
the question said that over fifty per cent of their pro se
defendants pleaded guilty. Thirty-three stated that
over three-quarters of the pro se defendants pleaded
guilty and twenty-eight stipulated that over ninety per
cent of them did.
"' Only four judges asserted that they did not deal
with a pro se trial any differently.
120 Twenty-one judges said that they advised the ac-
cused as to procedure and his rights.
121 Fourteen respondents declared that they liberal-
ized court procedure in trials where the accused repre-
sented himself.
manner, several judges responded in the negative. 22
However, more replied that they believed that the
state's attorney pursued his cause with less vigor
than usual, objecting less frequently and allowing
the defendant greater freedom in conducting his
defenseP2 Two judges commented that the prose-
cutor went to great lengths to protect the rights
of the accused, strenuously attempting to avoid
error and to avoid arousing the sympathy of the
jury for the defendant.
Despite these efforts by both judge and prose-
cutor, the average pro se defendant does not emerge
victorious. The figures for self-represented de-
fendants are sobering. Many judges remarked that
they could not remember a victorious pro se de-
fendant in a felony case and virtually all of the
rest put the success rate at less than five per cent.
The judges varied greatly in their estimates of the
number of defendants who pleaded their own
causes successfully in misdemeanor trials. A few
judges put the percentage of victorious defendants
at higher than fifty per cent, but more put it at
lower than five per cent. There was little disagree-
ment, however, as to the reasons behind the out-
come of pro se criminal trials. Fifty-six of the
fifty-eight respondents who answered the question
attributed the defeat of self-represented defendants
primarily to the "obvious guilt" of the accused."'
This explanation was followed in order of im-
portance by the defendant's ignorance of the law,
his general ignorance, and the complexity of the
case. As far as the judges were concerned, pro se
defendants rarely win cases; prosecutors lose
them. Forty-one of the forty-six judges who replied
to the question in terms of priority listed the
prosecution's weak case as the main reason why
the defendant was acquitted.'
In Fifteen of those judges who answered this question
believed that the prosecutor treated pro se trials no
differently than any other.
n Two judges criticized prosecutors for their lack of
aggressiveness in pro se cases.
124 Of the other two judges, one felt that most self-
represented defendants lost due to their general ignor-
ance while the other placed the blame on the accused's
ignorance of the law.
"2 Three of the remaining four judges felt that most
victorious pro se defendants were acquitted because, in
appearing without an attorney, they won the sympathy
of the jury.
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